Keywords
Hostos
internalism
reliabilism
How to Cite
Abstract
This paper examines the main objections that have plagued traditional epistemology, and have engendered the debate between the internalists and the externalists. While the first demand that the knower justify his or her beliefs in order to count them as knowledge, the latter fall back on the reliability of the faculties and processes which lead to knowing. The epistemic or intellectual virtues, which originate in Aristotle, have entered the core of the debate. Some philosophers (the separatists) believe that we can rely on these virtues without the implication that epistemology is based on ethics. The integrationists, on the other hand, believe that the epistemic virtues should be seen as an extension of moral virtues. This means that epistemology is based on ethics. Hostos‘s philosophy is examined according to this controversy, and the conclusion is that his position is integrationist.
How to cite:
Suárez-Silverio, E. (2013). Las virtudes epistémicas y las morales: Implicaciones para la epistemología y la ética en Hostos. Pedagogía, 46(1), 110-140. Retrieved from https://revistas.upr.edu/index.php/educacion/article/view/16418
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