Abstract
This paper examines the link between corporate governance structures and the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders‘ rights. Analysis of 97 firms from Brazil, Chile and Mexico that traded ADR shares in the United States between 2000 and 2002, indicates that increasing the size of the board by inclusion of additional independent outside directors lowers the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders‘ rights. Also, increases in the tenure of independent outside directors, decreases in CEOs‘ shareholdings and more interlocking directors on a board all serve to lower the potential for expropriation of minority shareholders‘ rights.By submitting a contribution to consideration of the Editorial Board of Fórum Empresarial, the authors attest that it is an original, unpublished work, which has not been nor will be simultaneously submitted to another journal for consideration and publication; that they are responsible for the work carried out and the content of the article; and they have the corresponding copyrights.
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