Cartesian Dualism: A Limited Vision? Sorne Objections and Replies
Portada del número 78, 2001
PDF (English)

Palabras clave

Cartesiano
Dualismo
Objeciones

Cómo citar

Monroy-Nasr, Z. . (2001). Cartesian Dualism: A Limited Vision? Sorne Objections and Replies. Diálogos, 36(78), 19–39. Recuperado a partir de https://revistas.upr.edu/index.php/dialogos/article/view/19296

Resumen

In the Discourse1 Part V, Descartes gives some empirical reasons against the possibility of explaining thought and language in mechanistic terms. In the light of the development of neuroscience, these arguments have led to some contemporary interpretations of Cartesian dualism which suggest that it was motivated by limitations in Descartes' mechanistic conception of physics. Some recent scholars maintain that
Descartes was not able to see how the brain or the nervous system could generate all the complex responses necessary for the production of
thought and language. As a consequence, Descartes remained a dualist.

PDF (English)
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.

Descargas

Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.