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## PROPAGANDA

THE psychological aspects of propaganda as a process of social communication appear in (1) the motives of the propagandists, (2) the techniques or special stimuli employed, and (3) the effects of such stimulation upon the recipients' beliefs and overt behavior. The raw or crude efficiency of propaganda is determined by the aims the propagandist holds: if the intended goal (no matter what its nature) is reached, his methods are considered successful by himself and others; if the end is not achieved, the propaganda is considered a failure. This sharp antithesis is defective (1) where it disregards variations in ultimate and hidden costs, monetary and human, (2) when a temporary lost cause prepares the ground for a later success, and (3) where due allowance is not made for the greater inherent difficulties in furthering certain objectives as compared with others. These associated conditions must be included in every full analysis of concrete instances of propaganda.

## RELATED SOCIAL FORCES

### PROPAGANDA AND EDUCATION

Warren's *Dictionary of Psychology* crisply defines propaganda as "organized publicity used as a means of influencing attitudes." The attitudes involved are invariably *social* attitudes, i.e., mental sets or dispositions toward questions affecting the relations or comparative standing of individuals or groups, which suggests that propaganda is normally much narrower and particularized in the kind of responses to which it directs attention than education, which the same source defines as "the development of abilities, attitudes, or forms of behavior, and the acquisition of knowledge, as a result of teaching or training." The implication is clear that whereas propaganda is generally exhausted in the process of specific attitude formation, the educative process aims at far broader and deeper changes in personalities.

However, the surface techniques of both propaganda and education are so similar in many cases that a distinction between the two processes can then be made only on uncertain ethical criteria. Both seek to change people; they necessarily use the same physical media (press, radio, film, spoken voice); they typically operate by persuasion rather than by violent coercion or through specific inducements, such as money bribes or the direct granting of socially esteemed positions; and they are both conditioned by the readiness of the learners to accept the suggestions conveyed to them. These are important and inevitable *partial resemblances*; as *total patterns* of social stimulation, however, education and propaganda differ significantly. The needs and interests of the persons to be educated are primary in one, whereas the special purpose of the propagandist is the center of reference in the other. Education is for the benefit of the pupils and the entire community; propaganda is for the benefit of the propagandist and those he represents. Ideally, education (when conducted as a scientific and humanitarian enterprise) is devoted to the whole truth and seeks to

look at all sides of all complex problems; normally, propaganda operates by sharply biased selection, suppression, emphasis, or distortion of relevant data and by denying a hearing to rival positions.

Propaganda is sometimes organized, systematic deception. Most education probably has some faint propagandistic note, and even the most blatant propaganda conveys some information with educational possibilities. But it is doubtful if the solipsistic view that "your education is my propaganda and my education is your propaganda" is tenable. There are important internal and external differences between the two operations, no matter how blurred and confused the picture often becomes.

Opposed to this view is the commoner opinion that what is labeled education is simply good propaganda, i.e., directed toward goals approved by the judge, while the term propaganda itself is today merely name-calling (itself a primitive propagandistic device!) for whatever the speaker or writer deems to be reprehensible propaganda. Certain critics who adopt this position argue as follows: human motives cannot be objectively appraised — all judgments passed on others' purposes are the extreme of subjectivism. At best, the difference between education and propaganda is a mere quantitative one, for even the most honest education does not succeed in presenting all the facts about a conflict problem; it is always a *weighted* version of the truth that is encountered in actual schooling. Indeed, all good teachers have certain great or small values for which they propagandize. Other critics go even further and declare that propaganda is no more than intensified and emotionalized education, and that the latter would benefit by copying the more vigorous and impressive practices of the former. Conceivably education at its socially worst and propaganda at its socially highest tend to approximate each other; but they usually have different reference points.

The superficial resemblances of propaganda and education have misled many into declaring that since the overt methods often are alike, the intellectual or other psychological processes

must be identical. This is like arguing that a book on physics and one on history are the same because both are written in the English language. Actually, even the procedures differ significantly. Education both permits and encourages choice among alternative conclusions after reflection upon the data; propaganda neglects or definitely discourages this. Propaganda ordinarily intensifies social conflict (paradoxically sometimes by denying its existence!); education seeks to resolve these group tensions through study and discussion. The aim of one is understanding of phenomena and group control of events; the aim of the other, power and domination over most people by some people.

At the risk of contrasting ideal or pure processes, one may complete this discussion of differences by declaring that characteristically, education is democratic and propaganda authoritarian in spirit; education seeks to build new discriminations and harder concepts in the learner and propaganda utilizes the older and easier ones in order to convince or motivate its victims; propaganda preferably goes with the tide of current public opinion, whereas education must often go against it in the interest of some long-term or permanent good; propaganda cripples intelligence and operates best on credulity, but education aims to eliminate superstitions and to establish what is called the scientific habit of mind.

#### PROPAGANDA AND ADVERTISING

Awareness of the over-all difference between education and propaganda may be compared to the naturalist's ability to distinguish between species in cases of zoological mimicry where one creature is often confused with another. On the other hand, the separateness of advertising and propaganda is harder to establish. Both seek to impress an audience favorably with the merits of a given product, service, personality, or cause, and (by implication at least) to disparage competing items; this seems to be true of these kindred processes whether a brand of

soap or the government of a great empire is the beneficiary of the effort. Both play frequently and deliberately (although not necessarily) upon the weaknesses, i.e., the ignorance, passion, and irrationality, of the recipients of the stimulation. Characteristically, advertising refers to a limited commercial context of specific vendible articles or personal services, grows out of restricted pecuniary motives, is mainly concerned with controlling a market, and is now commonly regulated by some informal code of ethics; propaganda on the other hand, has a more general political, ideological, and "social conflict" reference, and the ethical restraints—such as appear in words or acts of fairness to one's opponents—appear to be much weaker. The aim of the former is definite selective purchase or patronage by as large a group as can be reached; the aim of the latter is a monopoly of the vaguer loyalties and supporting conduct of a huge population.

The existence of institutional advertising demonstrates that it is impossible to draw a sharp line between propaganda and advertising. Large companies are not only interested in emphasizing the competitive superiority of their product, but also seek to gain the good will of a labor-conscious consuming public by releasing statistics about their wage-scales and employee well-being. No matter what institution is being supported, institutional advertising regularly reaches over into propaganda. The National Association of Manufacturers seems primarily concerned with fighting economic planning by government and with preserving public acceptance of the profit or enterprise system of private capitalism in the face of increasing popular awareness of its many serious limitations. The Communist Party devotes much energy to persuading people that life in the Soviet Union is much better than it really is. Both seek to make or to keep certain mental contents focal in the consciousness of wide masses. While there are minor differences in design and emphasis between advertising and propaganda, there is nothing in them comparable to the fundamental cleavage between propaganda and education.

All propaganda and most advertising that goes beyond

simple announcement are indirect and subtle devices for winning approval and wielding social power over others, and are usually lacking in scientific objectivity (although they may use many of the technical findings and research procedures of the laboratory). Despite their concern with controversial situations, they commonly and intentionally fail to provide an equitable hearing for all sides of a case. They are instruments of domination, not of authentic enlightenment. They are highly vulnerable in the light of moral standards emphasizing the organic interdependence of all ends and means as well as the concealed costs and social consequences of their activity.

## PROPAGANDA AND MORALE

The practical necessity of morale for social living supplies the motivation for much propaganda. Working efficiency, fighting spirit, willingness to sacrifice, the sense of happiness and well-being, faith in one's crowd, are lowered by unfavorable stimuli (including rival propaganda), and the wheels of counter-propaganda are therefore set in motion to maintain morale.

Where propaganda has an adequate factual basis, or cannot be effectively contradicted, it is likely to be successful in establishing and maintaining morale despite exaggerations and errors of omission. Thus, portraying the enemy as a cringing coward may boost home or civilian morale in wartime, but it is utterly inappropriate among the combat forces which have had immediate knowledge of the foe's valor. Atrocity stories, authentic or imaginary, have the same function and also the same limitations. When the morale of a group is high, propaganda is superfluous; when it is so low that apathy, or even hostility to the propagandist exists, propaganda is all but useless, for none but the exceptional trick will change such a situation. It is in the middle region of the morale scale that propaganda is most serviceable, bolstering sentiment after defeats and energizing what would otherwise be no more than a moderate effort into an all-out offensive.

## THESE DISTINCTIONS

Some such imputation of motives as characterizes this discussion must be made before propagandistic activities become intelligible to an observer. It is a postulate of this approach that ultimate or long-run efficiency and happiness in social living are dependent upon full access to the relevant facts and values about a problem. This propaganda in its various forms implicitly denies and actively tries to prevent.

## PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

### ESSENTIAL PATTERN

Since propaganda is systematic special pleading, it uses words, pictures, and other symbols in a such a way that the good emblems typical of positive experiences are associated with one cause and the bad labels of negative meanings are attached to its rival. Wartime propaganda makes one nation or alliance saintly and its enemies satanic. The rational view that the brightness spectrum includes many shades of grey is suppressed in favor of the more primitive view that reduces all opposition to extreme black and white. This is the basic propagandist pattern—all others are but variations of this fundamental theme.

A representative case appeared in the motion picture propaganda against Upton Sinclair's candidacy for Governor of California in the fall of 1934. For reasons best known to themselves, Hollywood officials were generally opposed to Sinclair. Shortly before the November election a presumptive newsreel was released in local theaters purporting to give authentic sound-film field interviews of an inquiring reporter with typical voters. The reporter was shown asking a dear motherly soul knitting on a California porch in attractive surroundings for whom she intended to vote. "Why, of course, Mr. Merriam is my choice." The next scene showed the same reporter prowling about in a dirty Okie-Arkie camp and putting the same ques-

tion to a tobacco-drooling unappetizing male. "Uppie Sinclair gits my vote, young man. Ain't he promised us guys all a pension if he wins?" Clearly the suggestion was that all the good citizens would support the Republican nominee and that none but the dregs of society would vote for the epic Democrat. Sinclair supporters suspected that this film was a disguised campaign document and that the persons depicted were all professional actors, a suspicion that was later confirmed.

The basic pattern of simple polarization in propaganda appears also in cartoons of a resplendent and heroic maiden representative of France (or the Allies or Western civilization) attacked by a terrifying gorilla wearing a Prussian helmet. One side must be depicted as wholly noble, the opposition as utterly depraved. St. George vs. the dragon, the forces of righteousness vs. the powers of evil, progress vs. catastrophe, humanity vs. barbarism — such is the elementary dualism of propaganda as contrasted with the complicated overlap revealed by a more scientific analysis. It is also elementary that the human need to structure any complex situation explains both the origin and the power of these oversimple stereotypes.

#### COMMON DEVICES

Clyde Miller, formerly a public relations counselor for certain utilities, and later Secretary of the short-lived but influential Institute for Propaganda Analysis (1937-41), has popularized the following 7 techniques of propaganda: (1) name-calling, (2) glittering generalities, (3) transfer, (4) testimonial, (5) plain folks, (6) card stacking and (7) band wagon. These devices depend for their effectiveness upon background conditions in the culture. A population that is not ready for the propagandist's stimulation will not be affected thereby. No amount of money, professional skill in publicity, or control of the channels of communication will suffice to make cannibals out of any modern industrial nation — the repugnance or taboo against this form of behavior is too deep-seated. Making

Mohammedans out of contemporary protestant or Catholic Americans is all but impossible; the most that could be hoped for is a few converts and a greater tolerance toward Islam as a religious faith. By contrast, whipping up a war against Soviet Russia would be easy. Objective realities do rigorously confine the area within which the propagandist can work successfully.

It is comforting to know that the propagandist can accomplish only that which the cultural traditions and current status of the propagandees permit. He merely makes these traditions work for him by utilizing, magnifying, and circulating the terms and appeals already at hand. The common fear of propaganda is hardly an adaptive response to its presence since propaganda itself is usually little more than one group's insistent call to action — often dubious action, to be sure, but best combated, not by flight or simple assault, but by the strengthening of rational controls generally.

#### NAME-CALLING

Some of the formulas of name-calling plainly rest upon the layman's ignorance of semantics; they are influential because much of our language is full of multiple meanings and because many of our common concepts are vague and undeveloped. Pin an ugly label upon one's opponent and one has greatly crippled his influence with those who by prior training have learned to respond disapprovingly to this term. It is utterly false psychology but perhaps good botany or chemistry to claim with Shakespeare that a rose by any other name would be just as sweet. If a man is an Italian, that is ordinarily a fairly neutral designation, but call him a fascist (correctly or incorrectly, the consequences are similar) in an antifascist culture which equates that word with black reaction and his standing drops precipitately. A subtle blending of correct and incorrect uses of emotionally-saturated or defamatory adjectives and substantives is standard practice among all propagandists. The

harm caused by libel and slander, occasionally leading to the nervous disintegration and even self-destruction of the victim, shows what a powerful instrument this can be.

### GLITTERING GENERALITIES

The arousal of antagonism via name-calling has its complement in the evocation of approbation through glittering generalities. Pennsylvania New Dealers in 1936 called upon the citizens of that commonwealth to vote for "the man with a heart, the party with a soul." Such sloganizing need not be devoid of a factual basis any more than "making the world safe for democracy" was an utter fraud either in intent or temporary accomplishment. One unfortunate sophomoric consequence of becoming propaganda-wise may be the nihilistic assumption that all human purposes are rotten and that every cause conceals a latent or covert crookedness. Such exaggerated suspicion may lead to an inability to identify genuine values and to support them when necessary.

### TRANSFER AND TESTIMONY

The transfer and testimonial technique are similar since both make use of prestige suggestion to support a particular position. Identification of the new specific purpose with a venerated symbol causes some of the manna to flow from the old to the new. It is like the pedagogical methods for making pupils interested in something — the new and neutral or even forbidding stuff is presented in connection with something that is already inherently interesting, the latter shedding its radiance over the other. When trial lawyers dramatically drag in God, motherhood, the Bible, home, and country to buttress their clients' case, they are relying on these dependable mechanisms to influence the jury in the desired direction.

Election placards and literature of all political parties make extensive use of the red, white, and blue symbolism. The

national colors with their overtones of patriotic sentiment are the constant to which the special cause as a variable is ordered. Any person or organization possessing high status in a certain group may be effectively used in this way. The racial pride of the Negro in Joe Louis, the boxer, was capitalized by the managers of Wendell Willkie's presidential candidacy in 1940 when Louis lent his support to the Republican nominee. University presidents' names, especially if they are in "big league" institutions, are prized by pressure groups because of the popular deference these figures generally arouse and the untested assumption that such persons would support only worthy objectives.

#### PLAIN FOLKS

The plain folks device is a form of play-acting that helps to establish rapport between the propagandist (or the personal symbol of some cause) and the average man. Franklin Roosevelt was photographed eating frankfurters at a picnic and most candidates in campaign season find it desirable to be seen or reported fishing, pitching hay, riding a tractor, milking a cow, or a similar healthy or normal activity. These things are done, not because they are strictly relevant to the issue, but because they provide a favorable setting against which to project the message that is primary. The plain folks histrionics are preliminary to the more pointed propagandistic stimulus *per se*, serving to create confidence in and familiarity with the personalities who are delivering the suggestions.

#### CARD STACKING

Card stacking is another colloquialism referring to outright invention, suppression, or warping of data in the interests of some end. This may be done crudely or with such adroitness that it is difficult to detect the concrete act of chicanery involved. During World War I, a British army communiqué con-

cocted the story that the Kaiser had referred to the English Army as "contemptible." Of course most of the people of Great Britain could have nothing but affection and admiration for their own kinsmen in the ranks even when they were beaten in battle. Hence, a boomerang effect was rightly counted on to intensify the popular hatred for the man who symbolized the enemy. Most Britishers today do not know that the Kaiser never said this, and they still pridefully refer to their troops as "The Old Contemptibles" (the fully documented account of this fraud is given in *Falsehood in War-Time* by Arthur Ponsonby, M. P., Chap. VIII, 1928).

Plain lies often work admirably — for time at least. Newspapers unfriendly to unions may conceal the real grievances that actually provoked a strike and emphasize instead the rough behavior that may accompany it. The constant effort of communist or cryptocommunist officials to deny that certain front organizations are communist-controlled or dominated is a form of distortion that presumably assists in overcoming the name-calling handicap from which their activities would otherwise suffer by creating confusion among those not intimately informed about that fact.

#### BAND WAGON

The band wagon effect is a popular designation for the assumed tendency of people to want to be on the biggest or winning side regardless of the merits of the debate. Calling a wartime alliance the United Nations, even though it embraced rival allies and even though opposing Axis nations and certain neutrals were pointedly excluded, is an example of an effective appeal to majority-mindedness. The propagandist tries to create what the social psychologist has called an *impression of universality*. Few people are willing to be in a minority, unless that minority is favored in an important social way by winning prizes cherished in the culture. All other minorities are unpopular, and one seems to suffer in some way by being identified with them.

There is good experimental support (Marple, 1933) for the view that more persons change their opinions in the direction of what they believe is majority sentiment than in the direction of expert judgment. Evidently most persons become more secure in their beliefs when they find that these are shared by great numbers. I may be wrong but 100,000,000 fellow-citizens can't be! A sense of personal safety is enhanced by going over to the dominant side. However, Gallup, of the American Institute of Public Opinion, doubts whether there really is a true band-wagon effect in elections, since the division of opinion in national samples is frequently about the same at the end of a vigorous campaign as at the start, despite the wide publicity often given to straw-ballot percentages which are alleged to intimidate the minority.

The band-wagon influence seems to be of lesser magnitude than is commonly believed and apparently is operative only under limited social conditions. It may have little effect upon Republican and Democratic machines under our political duopoly, which rarely divide in anything more pronounced than a 60-40 ratio, but contribute seriously to handicap the growth of socialist, farmer-labor and other third parties, which clearly must begin with smaller fractions.

#### PREJUDICE IN PROPAGANDA

The first thing which any skilled propagandist does is to equip himself with an intimate knowledge of the variety and intensity of the prejudices of the people he is seeking to influence. Next, the probable effect of each upon his special cause and its rivals is estimated. Then the message he aims to convey is tied in with each one of these concrete prejudices by various literary and artistic vehicles; strong emotional rather than critical intellectual appeals are preferred. The amount of demonstrable or probable enlightenment on the matter prevailing among the specific population subgroup being stimulated must be carefully considered. Finally, for maximum effectiveness the account that is dressed up must be widely dis-

tributed, particular care being taken to see that it reaches the bellwethers or molders of community opinion.

As an illustration of the plain appeal to prejudice, we may consider the March of Time film, *The Ramparts We Watch*, which was widely shown during the excited defense preparations of 1940-41. This had a staged scene depicting an American flag from a supposedly torpedoed vessel slowly sinking beneath the waves and another portraying an alleged German radio announcer declaring with contorted facial emphasis that "Americans don't make good soldiers." Such excessively strong stimuli reduced resistance at that time to conscription, vast armament expenditures, and active aid to Britain on a short-of-war basis, all effects which they apparently were intended to further.

Counter-propaganda depends upon the cultural level and other background conditions in the society concerned just as much as does propaganda. German counter-propaganda in the United States during the rising antagonistic tide fostered by official administration policies and other forces was planned to build good will toward things German by free distribution of beautiful colored photographs on a variety of cultural themes, reproduction of German medieval and Renaissance paintings of the Madonna and Child for circularization during the Christmas season, books and pamphlets on road-building, forestry, science laboratories, and other innocent or non-provocative themes. Through fine printing and technically superior and interesting human photographs this German propaganda evidently indirectly tried to moderate the strong anti-Nazi sentiment prevailing in public and private quarters by suggesting that there were decent persons and institutions still operating within the Reich, rather than boldly attempting the impossible task of converting the already strong hostile attitude into a pro-German orientation. But the more favored British information services, from the point of view of American prejudice, concentrated on showing what a good government and culture the English have and how depraved their German opponents were; ostensibly they limited themselves to stating their case and then left it to their American readers (and listeners) to decide for themselves

what form their assistance should take. Yet the suggestions implanted were always clear and strong and never ambiguous.

## RESPONSE OF THE PUBLIC

### REACTION TO PROPAGANDA

Most persons seem to recognize as propaganda that which they do not like for any reason and fail to identify as propaganda that which conforms with their apparently independent latent judgments about persons or situations. However, incidents do arise (as in defeated nations) where temporarily successful propaganda that has led to undesired consequences causes its victims to turn against and disparage those prominently identified with its manipulation. This is a delayed awareness of their own gullibility. In time of peace many citizens appreciate that they have been fed much gross propaganda during a past war period, but these same personalities may be victimized again in another war crisis because the social configuration usually changes sufficiently to permit an acceptable modification of techniques. The same holds for nonwar content unless revolutionary institutional transformations have meanwhile occurred.

Most of those who actively resist what is to them hostile propaganda come to accept without protest an objectively transformed situation that has become a *fait accompli* partly through such propaganda, apparently on the principle that "one can't unscramble scrambled eggs." The result is a constant race between the astute propagandist's ability to invent new and plausible appeals (largely because the old devices have lost their magic) and the relatively dull-witted and slow-moving public's ability to see through these mechanisms. A keener minority opposition may know full well what is happening and succeed in protecting the integrity of its own personality, and yet be impotent to change the course of events. Under the circumstances it is not hard to guess who will normally be ahead and who

behind. This cycle of group acceptance-rejection or gullibility-disillusionment appears to be capable of indefinite repetition. Propaganda thus typically serves to perpetuate the social control of those who occupy the seats of power; less typically it may appear in the efforts of alert groups now out of authority to become its possessors. In other words, most propaganda is majority propaganda — an immensely significant fact. Propaganda is invariably a symptom and an instrument of the conflicts between ins and outs occurring in a disunited society.

### MEASURING PROPAGANDA EFFECTS

The result desired by propaganda is an altered belief or action in a designated group. A certain fraction of the propagandist's effort must therefore be devoted to determining the kind and amount of change in public opinion he produces. It is at this point that the testing tools of the psychologist are conspicuously employed. Before any well designed propaganda campaign is begun, one must know the distribution of opinion on the issues with which one is concerned. Presumably, this opinion is unsatisfactory in some respect. For example, the William Allen White Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, working to secure armed United States naval convoys for British ships in Atlantic waters (1941) might have discovered that on a certain date a sampling poll showed 30 per cent of the voters in favor of this quasi-belligerent step, 30 per cent opposed, and 40 per cent undecided. A further breakdown might have indicated the degrees of support and the intensity of opposition to the plan. If, in the judgment of competent persons, it seemed possible to change this unsafe distribution by certain appeals adequately publicized (like calling the move "sea patrols" rather than "sea convoys") a few weeks or months after the campaign a verifying or retesting poll could again have been administered. Assuming effective stimuli and the support of cooperating world events, the second (or final) poll might have indicated 50 per cent of the voters in favor, 25 per cent opposed, and 25 undecided. Whether this new dis-

tribution should be construed as a sufficient go ahead signal to public officials would depend upon the type of current citizen support they demand before venturing upon any significant move.

The uses and interpretation of such before-and-after data are usually very simple; certainly they are the safest and most exact guides now available. Above all, these procedures demonstrate conclusively that public opinion can be shaped by those in control of some or all of the media of communication and that, within the limits of the norms current in any culture, this important social phenomenon can be manufactured or made to order like so many machinery-produced articles. Ordinary commercial advertising unquestionably affects the results of market surveys made in terms of acquaintance with, or use of, specific products. Motion picture, radio or platform speeches, cartoons and printed texts all create modification in thought and behavior. Just what this is qualitatively and quantitatively can now be ascertained with a remarkably high degree of precision by the opinionaire inquiries of contemporary journalism using suitably timed and stratified samples of mass response to reveal the changes resulting from the introduction of a large-scale stimulus.

## VALUE TO SOCIETY

The utility of propagandistic activities for mankind as a whole is disputable. But there is no doubt that this is one of the ways in which the work of the world gets done. Much propaganda may not unfairly be described as quasi-criminal behavior. At any rate, there is no doubt that it is essentially psychological warfare — and therefore as good or evil as the institution of war itself. But current folkways, do not look upon it as particularly pathological perhaps because its vagueness, universality, and obscurity protect it from the resentment that is normally directed against other and more obvious antisocial conduct, such as forgery or petty thievery.

In perspectives of time and space, propaganda seems to be one manifestation of the competitive struggle for existence, perhaps doomed to disappear as cooperation among living creatures becomes the evolutionary norm. The ethical confusion of the current age complicates immeasurably the problem of estimating justly the services that propaganda performs. No one expects warring governments or bitter rival economic groups to deal scientifically or even judiciously with each others' antagonistic claims — a third party must usually be relied upon to approximate this; unfortunately, such a party is hard to find because almost everyone has some sort of prior attitudinal or emotional identification with the contending forces. Hence, noncontroversial themes are preferred by those who wish to pursue a less embarrassing type of research.

It could be argued that it is better for men to pursue certain group objectives, even if current community organization demands illusions and benign chicanery in so doing, than that they be left to drift along in a state of goallessness. Society needs directives and these the propagandist supplies. Truth, to be sure, is often sacrificed in the process, but then men live by other, and perhaps higher, values than this austere good alone seems to symbolize.

In a harmonious culture composed solely of well adjusted personalities, propaganda, as we know it, would probably have no place. Conceivably, the socially valuable part of contemporary propaganda could be incorporated in a beneficial system of informal education. Insofar as the aim of mature human effort is to approach such a state of affairs, it seems reasonable to expect that psychology, at least in its social, educational, and industrial branches, should eventually lead to the extinction of what we now know as propaganda and advertising instead of merely making them more efficient in terms of existing moral standards, as has been the case to date.

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