Species' wellbeing, counterfactual comparative harm, and the non-identity problem

Abstract

The non-identity problem raises problems for many versions of the counterfactual comparative account of harm. If an individual’s existence depends on climate change, then we cannot say that climate change makes this individual worse off than they would be otherwise, since otherwise they would not exist. However, I argue in this paper that consideration for species’ wellbeing avoids the non-identity problem: the species can be worse off than it would have been otherwise because the species existence does not depend on climate change. I first examine a number of views of counterfactual comparative harm and argue that they are subject to the non-identity problem. Then I survey a number of views of species, showing that they are consistent with my argument. I, then, offer a novel account species’ wellbeing and species’ harm. Species harm and wellbeing is the aggregate projected aggregate welfare of all of the individual members over time. I then argue that this account of species’ wellbeing avoids the non-identity problem. In the last section, I answer objections.