PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND CLIMATE CHANGE ENGAGEMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN: THE CASE OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

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Abstract

This article explores the prospects for civil society engagement in the quest for justice in global climate change policy. Using Trinidad and Tobago as a case, in the context of the broader CARICOM framework, the paper examines civil society participation: methods of engagement, challenges and effectiveness. Notwithstanding some engagement in global action, civil society organizations have engaged in the climate change arena mainly in education, awareness building and research and training at the community level; their influence and impact in official spaces have been negligible. We conclude that given the transnational nature of climate change and the market-oriented approach in official climate change discussions at the global level, participation in progressive global/transnational coalitions with the view to attaining climate change justice is imperative. This is particularly important in cases where avenues for active engagement are not available at the national and regional levels and/or where parochial interests dominate the climate change agenda.

Keywords: climate change, Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago, civil society, climate justice

Resumen

Este artículo explora las perspectivas de participación de la sociedad civil en la búsqueda de justicia en la política global de cambio climático. Usando Trinidad y Tobago como caso de estudio, en el contexto del marco más amplio de CARICOM, el documento examina la participación de la sociedad civil: métodos de participación, desafíos y efectividad. A pesar de cierta participación en la acción global, y de que las organizaciones de la sociedad civil se han involucrado en el ámbito del cambio climático principalmente en educación, sensibilización e investigación y capacitación a nivel comunitario, su influencia e impacto en los espacios oficiales han sido insignificantes. Concluimos que dada la naturaleza transnacional del cambio climático y el enfoque orientado al mercado en las discusiones oficiales sobre el cambio climático a nivel global, la participación en coaliciones progresivas globales/

transnacionales con miras a lograr la justicia del cambio climático, es imprescindible. Esto es particularmente importante en los casos en que las vías para la participación activa no están disponibles a nivel nacional y regional y/o donde los intereses parroquiales dominan la agenda del cambio climático.

Palabras clave: cambio climático, Caribe; Trinidad y Tobago, sociedad civil, justicia climática

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article explore les possibilités de participation qui s'offrent à la société civile pour s'investir dans la recherche d'une politique mondiale dans la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique. Prenant comme exemple Trinidad et Tobago dans le contexte de marché plus vaste du CARICOM, cet article examine comment la société civile lutte contre le réchauffement climatique en analysant ses méthodes d'action, leur efficacité et les défis rencontrés. En dehors d'actions sociales menées à l'échelle internationale, les organismes de sociétés civiles se sont engagés dans la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique en matière d'éducation, de campagnes de sensibilisation, de recherche et de formation au niveau communautaire ; leur impact sur les espaces officiels reste toutefois négligeable. Nous en concluons que le caractère transnational du changement climatique et l'approche de marché adoptée lors des discussions officielles sur le climat à l'échelle mondiale participent de coalitions mondiales progressistes visant à parvenir à une justice pour l'environnement qui reste essentielle. Cela nous semble d'autant plus important dans les cas où des mesures d'action au niveau national et régional ne sont pas toujours envisageables et/ou lorsque les intérêts locaux prédominent dans les échanges autour de l'environnement.

Mots-clés : changement climatique, Caraïbe, Trinidad et Tobago, société civile, justice environnementale

Introduction

Global warming threatens the very existence of the human species. "Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level" (IPCC 2007:30). An Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report (2014) indicated that climate change has had adverse impacts on "hydrological systems," "water resources," and some crop yields. It has also changed natural ecosystems, caused the extinction of terrestrial, freshwater and marine species, led to health problems and death and exacerbated extreme weather conditions.

Notably, "[c]limate-related hazards exacerbate other stressors, often with negative outcomes for livelihoods, especially for people living in poverty" (IPCC 2014:6).

The United Nations Environmental Programme (2008) reports that although Small Island Developing States (SIDS)[1] contribute less than one percent of global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, their physical characteristics make them particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2007) warned that ocean surface temperatures where the majority of SIDs are located have been rising by 0.1°C per decade. This means that SIDS could suffer from "increased extreme events such as precipitation intensity, tropical storms, or droughts" (UNEP 2008:14). Their challenging socio-economic situation compounds the situation and makes SIDS among the most vulnerable countries globally to climate change (UNEP 2008:4). This vulnerability to natural disasters, increasing intensity of extreme weather conditions, rising sea levels, and declining fresh-water supplies promises to exacerbate threats to livelihoods. Climate change therefore, poses increased threats for the Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) 17 million inhabitants who populate 15 small and low-lying states and hinders the region's—and by extension—global efforts to reduce poverty and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The significance that the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held, not only for states, but also for civil society, cannot be overstated since a new, legally binding international agreement on climate change was being negotiated for the first time in over 20 years. Caribbean Community states therefore, hoped that a legally binding, universal agreement aligned to the CARICOM position to limit global warming to 1.5°C would be adopted. They perceived that such an agreement would be necessary to offset their increasing vulnerability to climate risk, which has negatively impacted key areas of economic activity and compounded existing socio-economic challenges. The concept of climate justice was therefore, an issue for the Caribbean, albeit implicitly, in the Paris negotiations and will continue to be one in future climate change discussions. The neoliberal orientation of the global climate change framework (see Okereke and Coventry 2016) makes efforts towards achieving climate justice even more pressing.

The concept of climate justice represents an evolution of norms and framing of the climate change debate away from purely an environmental issue, and towards a social one. Discussions around justice and related matters have been ongoing since the inception of the UNFCCC in 1992; however, there are divergent understandings of the concept of climate justice (Gach 2019). Notwithstanding these differences, "[c]limate justice

is often described as a framework which links the policies and technologies of tackling climate change with some kind of approach to social justice (human rights, redistribution, impact on the poor, etc.)" (Scandrett 2016:477). For the purpose of this article we define the concept as outlined in the nine principles provided by Gach (2019) as follows:

(i) equality and equity of rights and opportunity for all;
(ii) underlining asymmetrical vulnerabilities among countries to the impact of, and ability to adapt to climate change;
(iii) countries which have historically contributed to climate change bearing the responsibility of emissions reduction;
(iv) compensation for loss and damage resulting from the adverse effects of climate change;
(v) linking climate change policy to human rights;
(vi) acknowledging that climate change impacts cultural heritage and the rights of indigenous communities;
(vii) acknowledging the role that climate change and its policy responses could play in increasing social inequalities;
(viii) rejection of market and technology-based responses and solutions that do not address the root causes of climate change;
(ix) and locating climate change problems in global structures, processes and systems such as global capitalism and globalization.

The above principles serve as a normative rather than the analytical framework for this article.

The article examines civil society's involvement in climate change policy formulation, in the Caribbean, with specific reference to the Paris negotiations. We argue that due to the Caribbean's extreme vulnerability to climate-induced threats and the disproportionate adverse impacts climate change will have on ordinary citizens, relative to other regions, save for the Pacific, active civil society participation in global climate change related discussions is essential. Although states have been seen to hold responsibility for the realization of climate justice (Baptiste and Rhiney 2016), moral weight and legitimacy can be borne out of the efforts of populations who are most vulnerable and negatively impacted by the adverse effects of climate change. This is particularly relevant in cases where there is a democratic deficit at the national level. Not only can civil society organizations (CSOs) sensitize their networks and communities on likely impacts of climate change on their livelihoods, but they can also tap into global networks to increase visibility and lobby for climate justice.

While there are divergent conceptualizations of civil society, it is "generally understood as the space between the state and the family, where organizations, which are neither part of the state nor the market, interact with a view to achieving the common good" (Carbone 2008:241). In this vein, this article subscribes to one of Michael Edwards's conceptualizations of civil society: the sphere of "associational life" consisting of various forms of voluntary associations (Edwards 2009:18). Moreover, civil society is not a homogenous entity; while civil society is usually seen as "an actor," it is in reality a "heterogeneous collection of organizations and initiatives with different roles and functions" (Brandsen, Trommel and Verschuere 2017:677). In this regard, we focus on groups functioning in the climate sphere. While civil society groups have different areas of focus, we argue that climate justice should serve as the overarching framework within which they locate their work and the main driver for their advocacy. Moreover, the climate justice principles outlined above provide the substantive basis upon which this engagement could take place.

This paper contributes to the literature on the challenges of subsidiarity and lower level contributions towards global policy formulation and advances the case for civil society engagement in progressive action at the global level to keep national governments accountable in global decision-making processes with the view to attaining climate justice. Given the transnational nature of climate change, the paper highlights the significance of participation in global/transnational civil society action for achieving climate justice. It makes a case for conscious national CSOs to plug into global networks as an avenue towards the subordination of parochial interests to those of the global community at large.

The paper is organized as follows: above, we introduced the article by setting the background and context, clarifying two key concepts and providing the article's contribution. Second, we outline the methodology. Third, we provide existing literature in the relevant areas: civil society participation, democracy and global governance; civil society and environmental engagement and the contributions of civil society to environmental governance. Fourth, we outline CARICOM's policy framework for civil society participation and CARICOM's policy on climate change. Fifth, we give an overview of civil society organizations working on climate and related issues. Sixth, we answer the research questions by outlining the ways in which civil society engages in climate change processes, identifying the challenges CSOs face in the process, and assessing the impact of their engagement. Finally, we conclude by reflecting on the implications for democratic legitimacy and sustainable policy-making, and propose civil society collaboration with global progressive networks as an avenue for efforts towards advancing climate justice.

Methodology

The article interrogates two broad questions: (i) how are Trinidad and Tobago's CSOs contributing to processes, discussions, and actions to address the challenges of climate change, and; (ii) how successful has their engagement been? We use a qualitative methodology and the article is based on information derived from questionnaires[2] and interviews, complemented by government and civil society documents and reports, organizations' webpages, newspaper articles and scholarly books and articles. It uses the single case of Trinidad and Tobago to examine civil society participation in climate change processes and discusses the case within the broader CARICOM context. Trinidad and Tobago presents a compelling case because of its heavy economic dependence on fossil fuels.

We provide the civil society landscape in Trinidad and Tobago. There is a multiplicity of NGOs working on environmental issues, but most do not focus specifically on climate change, and of those who do, very few are actively engaged in the policy-making process. Groups with a regional focus include Panos Caribbean, the Caribbean Youth Environment Network (CYEN), and the Caribbean Natural Resource Institute (CANARI).

In Trinidad and Tobago, the Council of Presidents of the Environment (COPE) is the umbrella organization for environmental NGOs. A significant objective of COPE is to coordinate the work of its diverse membership. Of COPE's 18 members, only three reportedly work on climate change. There are also many registered environmental NGOs working on climate change, which are not members of COPE.

Using purposive sampling, we compiled a listing of NGOs working on climate change and administered questionnaires to twelve groups. Of the twelve, ten NGOs provided feedback. We conducted in-depth interviews with six of these groups. In-depth responses were provided by a CARICOM representative via email. Areas covered in the questionnaires and interviews are as follows:

(i) general objectives and work of the organizations;
(ii) organizations' position/stance on climate change;
(iii) substantive area/s of focus in relation to climate change;
(iv) concrete areas of work being undertaken and levels at which the work is being undertaken (community, national, regional and international);
(v) groups or sectors being targeted;
(vi) strategies and methods employed and outcome;
(vii) nature and level of collaboration (national, regional and

international) with state and non-state actors and outcome of collaboration;

(viii) participation in national, regional or international conferences or meetings on climate change, nature of, and the outcome of participation;

(ix) influence of civil society in climate change decision-making at the national and CARICOM levels;

(x) and civil society groups' outreach and impact in relation to climate change policy in the region and globally.

We analyzed the data by identifying themes which emerged in relation to the research questions.

Civil Society Participation, Democracy and Global Governance

Democracy has a wide range of definitions, yet a consistent theme is that it is "a condition where a community of people exercise collective self-determination" (Scholte 2002:7). It follows, therefore, that a healthy democracy is one in which the citizenry of a country can participate in shaping the decisions that affect their lives—beyond the election of officials to government. Civil society is seen to promote democracy and governance in many ways: representing the interests of constituencies, monitoring activities of states, holding governments accountable, keeping powers of the state in check, advocating for, and empowering the marginalized and vulnerable, bringing issues of importance to the general public and promoting legitimacy of decision-making processes. Indeed, some posit that NGOs play a essential role as part of what "drives the interdependence that presses on and qualifies sovereignty" (Finkelstein 1995:367). Further, "associations that confront the state help in democratizing it" and such confrontation by a 'vigorous civil society' leads to good governance (Onuf 2013:186-187).

Nevertheless, some warn that the link between civil society and democracy is not automatic (Diamond 1994; Putnam 1993; Ottoway and Carothers 2000). They argue that their participation may detract from, rather than promote democracy and good decision-making, citing instances where civil society may be 'captured' by donors and so compromise the democratic and development processes (Edwards and Hulme 1996). Others conclude that different types of CSOs have varying impacts on different aspects of democracy. For example, CSOs with a political agenda play a role in keeping governments in check, while groups that are less political, empower citizens to participate and promote democratic values (Uhlin 2009). In relation to environmental governance and the implementation of environmental treaties more specifically,

Bernauer, Böhmelt, and Koub (2013) found that the leverage and impact of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) rest on the level of democracy in the society. In societies with high levels of democracy, ENGOs' impact is marginal or even nonexistent whereas their influence and leverage is significant in non-democracies.

It has been said that the participation of civil society organizations, particularly those from developing countries, has been thwarted with challenges in global governance. This raises questions about the extent to which civil society is democratizing global governance. Fisher and Green (2004) state that these CSOs have been relegated to the margins of agenda-setting and decision-making at the global level which limits their influence, a phenomenon they call the "disenfranchisement" of civil society. Disenfranchisement is adversely affected by "institutional legitimacy" and "organizational form." In the case of the former, groups which have formal recognition by bodies to participate in processes have asymmetrical access and possibilities to influence others. Concerning the latter, groups with more formal structures, i.e. NGOs, are more likely to be recognized and larger ones have greater capacity to meet accreditation criteria for access and participation. This, therefore, poses a disadvantage for civil society groups with more loose structures such as social movements and smaller NGOs (Fisher and Green 2004:71-72; see also Ford 2003). As a result, excluded and dissatisfied segments of civil society have engaged in protest action outside of official channels of participation (Fisher 2004). Others make a similar claim as Fisher and Green about the World Trade Organization, stating that Northern NGOs are disproportionally represented and have more access than those from the South (Wu 2016; Edwards 2002).

Other criticisms are targeted at civil society groups themselves and their practices. It has been said that civil society organizations have not engaged or reflected deliberately and sufficiently on how their work and practices may advance or hinder their democratic legitimacy and that of global governance (Scholte 2002). Edwards (2002) lists specific criticisms in the literature related to civil society legitimacy in global governance:

> they do not formally represent those on whose behalf they claim to speak; they are not accountable for their actions, or the results of the positions they take; their policy positions are often inaccurate and misleading; and they are active only at the global level and have no roots in local and national politics. (Edwards 2002:74)

Additionally, in relation to climate change-related policy, civil society organizations could support neo liberal capitalist interests and reinforce the status quo. This could happen particularly in the context of an increasingly growing phenomenon—NGO partnerships with powerful

corporate actors through philanthropy and other avenues (Holmes 2012). According to Holmes:

> since the 1980s but accelerating since 2000, leading conservation NGOs have developed closer relationships with corporations, working with them, copying their methods in areas such as marketing, taking their donations and generally developing more positive attitudes towards their activities […]. [Because] philanthropy provid[es] alternative sources of money and expertise for solving society's problems […] states often encourage philanthropists to take over state functions. (2012:188)

This development allows "greenwashing"—the process by which "a firm strategically discloses […] positive but not negative aspects of its environmental performance" to boost its public image (Lyon and Maxwell 2011:29)—to go unchecked and uncontested.

We subscribe to the view that CSOs, if they have not been co-opted, or are not colluding with powerful interests, can enhance democracy, foster empowerment and ownership of decision-making processes and by extension promote just, equitable and sustainable climate policy outcomes.

Civil Society's Environmental Engagement: A Transnational Phenomenon

Civil society's involvement in a broad spectrum of issues is notable (see for example, Blake 2004). Because of the far-reaching and profound effect of climate change on the planet, it is not surprising that global climate change talks have attracted the attention of civil society organizations which have formed coalitions to engage in the issue at the global level. Such action is consistent with their participation in the environmental arena. In the immediate post war period, NGOs played an important role due to the lack of a UN agency to address environmental issues. The establishment of the International Union for the Protection of Nature in 1948, facilitated a role for NGOs in the development of conventions, notably, the 1972 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna and the 1971 Ramsar Convention on international wetlands. The creation of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth in 1971 was evidence that the environment was becoming increasingly prominent to CSOs. Some 400 NGOs attended the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Twenty years later, at the Rio Earth Summit, approximately 10,000 NGOs were in attendance. Rio marked a turning point in NGOs-government relations with hundreds of NGOs making input into the development of Agenda 21, the Forest Principles, the Rio Declaration, and the Climate Change and Biodiversity treaties which were to be signed at the conference

(Yamin 2001).

Not only did CSOs engage and lobby governments, but they also created an 'NGO Forum' and established networks among major groups through various NGO events and activities. As a result, Agenda 21 encouraged governments to acknowledge that NGOs "possess well established and diverse experience, expertise, and capacity in fields of particular importance to the implementation and review of environmentally sound and socially responsible sustainable development" (see United Nations 1992 Article 27:3). Since the Rio Earth Summit, NGOs' engagement in decision-making processes has increased. According to Yamin (2001), this development can be explained by the formal recognition of, and channels for, NGOs participation as mandated by Agenda 21. It also comes from the pressing need to engage in an issue with potentially devastating consequences.

According to Martens (2005), the strengthening of networks in the environmental field is part of a broader phenomenon of trans-nationalization of civil society. Caldwell (1988) asserts that this is aided by ever improving telecommunications and transport. These have facilitated trans-border networking among citizens and citizen-driven organizations. The ability to share substantive and strategic information and analysis with similar groups globally has facilitated greater awareness, giving more confidence to CSOs and increasing their capacity to contribute to policy-making. This global network of actors is seen as "nothing less than the outline of a future political order within which states will no longer constitute the seat of sovereignty" (Baker 2002b:115). Regarding the environment, the increasingly networked NGOs may be seen as part of an "environmental movement… 'gone global,' many of which are actively seeking partnerships and cooperative activities with their colleagues from other countries" (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke 2011:255).

Transnational civil society is thus critical to confronting transnational problems such as the "high and unsustainable levels of energy consumption and natural resource depletion" (Hurrell 2007:220) which have contributed to anthropogenic climate change today. In confronting such a crisis, a unified, global approach must be found which should include more actors than merely nation states as the "domestic weaknesses of particular states and state structures" are said to pose a direct challenge to sustainability (Hurrell 2007:221). Civil society can assist with the shifting of "public and political attitudes" that will lead to solutions (Hurrell 2007:227). According to Betsill (2011), one example is their role in placing climate change on the agenda at the 1988 World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere held in Toronto, Canada.

Civil society actors participate as both 'outsiders' and 'insiders' in global climate change discussions. Their insider status is defined by

the UNFCCC (1992a Article 7:6), which makes provision for the participation of CSOs in sessions of the Convention bodies as observers. Opportunities are also provided for CSO engagement outside of convention sessions under Article 6, where state parties are to "promote and facilitate education, training and public awareness at the national, sub-regional and regional levels" (UNFCCC 1992b Article 6:a). While many CSOs have also engaged outside official processes, others have straddled both 'insider' and 'outsider' spaces.

In this vein, we outline, below, some key roles CSOs play in global environmental governance.

Civil Society Transforming Global Environmental Governance

Though civil society participation in issues of global importance is not new, the ongoing globalizing processes have created an increasingly complex world where states have witnessed a multiplication of their social and policy functions which leaves some unable to fulfil many of these functions adequately. This has created a space for CSOs to fill gaps such as in the environmental arena. However, while "the environmental domain has been a laboratory for new modes of governance," governments remain the rule makers, policy implementers and dispute settlers (Hurrell 2007:184-187). In this case, according to Hurrell (2007), civil society participation then is not necessarily transformative but adds another layer of complexity to global environmental governance which leads to a more dense system of governance as civil society is integrated into it. Beyerlin and Marauhn (2011) maintain that the story of civil society in global environmental politics is therefore not simply a tale of growth, but of integration, with CSOs being recognized among the non-state actors contributing to governance in the area. Caldwell (1988) states that civil society organizations have acquired a seat at the table in the UNFCCC process. Such inclusion and the presence of civil society within national delegations have changed environmental diplomacy, moving it away from closed-door negotiations towards more modern network diplomacy.

Bridging the Implementation Gap

Caldwell (1988) posits that civil society may also play a role in monitoring and reporting to ensure that states are adhering to their international commitments. This is because according to Susskind and Ozawa (1992), a legally binding international climate change agreement does not guarantee enforcement. Caldwell (1988), asserts that no state is a monolith and constituencies with competing interests may hinder or

prevent treaty implementation. Fouéré (1988) adds that lack of capacity is often the reason that poorer nations fail to comply with treaty provisions. These gaps are compounded when no sanctions exist for non-compliance. Therefore, according to Fouéré (1988), the question of the unwillingness or uncooperativeness of governments in complying with ratified treaties highlights the need for non-governmental entities to be vigilant, particularly in cases where there is a perception that governments are seeking to exploit perceived uncertainty in scientific data to avoid their treaty obligations.

Caldwell (1988) observes that in seeking to bridge this gap CSOs have been playing a more significant role in the treaty process to help build consensus and after treaty ratification, engage in monitoring and reporting to ensure that states adhere to their international commitments, and provide continuity, data collection and ongoing monitoring that multilateral environmental agreements demand. In the area of climate change where the stakes are particularly high for small island states, the role of civil society is therefore critical.

Enhancing Small States' Participation

One of civil society's invaluable contributions to the climate change arena has come from their partnership with small states. The success of groups such as Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS) owes much to civil society assistance, allowing the latter to "punch above its weight" at the global level. NGOs have provided AOSIS with both technical and legal expertise allowing it to advance cogent arguments in its favor. Betzold (2010) notes this increased capacity at the global level as an example of borrowed power. Betzold, Castro, and Weiler (2012) assert that fuelled by borrowed power coupled with pooled influence, AOSIS became a major player in the UNFCCC negotiations.

Having discussed the promises and pitfalls of civil society in global governance and climate change-related policy, we turn to CARICOM—the regional body in which Trinidad and Tobago is a member—and examine the policy framework for civil society participation in the governance process, generally, and the regional policy position on climate change.

Policy Framework for Civil Society Participation in CARICOM

The Charter of Civil Society for the Caribbean Community, which was adopted by Heads of Government of CARICOM in 1997, recognized the significant role which NGOs were expected to play in furthering the broad developmental objectives articulated in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. Intrinsic in this Charter was CARICOM civil society's

role in strengthening the integration process across social, economic, and political dimensions. Further support for this approach is provided in the CARICOM Liliendaal Statement of Principles on Forward Together (2002). In light of complex challenges confronting the region due primarily to globalization, partnering with civil society to address these concerns was seen as necessary.

CARICOM's position on global climate negotiations has become a significant component of its foreign policy thrust which identifies climate change as a "clear and present danger" to the sustainable development of the region (CARICOM 2009). The CARICOM Declaration for Climate Change Action formed the basis for the region's negotiating position at the seminal climate change negotiations of the COP21. The Declaration noted that "(SIDS) remain a special case considering their unique and particular vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change." CARICOM called for "an ambitious international agreement that limits global warming to as far below 1.5°C as possible, to ensure the survival of the Caribbean States and territories." "[CARICOM also called for a treaty which addresses the specific needs of SIDS and provisions for adaptation including] adequate, predictable, new and additional finance, technology and capacity-building support, and strengthening of the institutional arrangements" (CARICOM 2015).

Below, we provide an overview of the CSOs working on climate change before examining how Trinidad and Tobago's civil society organizations are participating, the effectiveness of their engagement and what the broad implications are.

Overview of Civil Society Organizations

Aims and Objectives of CSOs

Since CSOs' work relating to climate change is located within the broader environmental sphere, their objectives span a wide and diverse range of issues. These include: participatory land management, marine and coastal conservation, biodiversity and ecosystem conservation of natural resources, renewable energy, climate change justice, adaptation and mitigation, greenhouse gas emission reduction, disaster prevention, sustainable and responsible development, equitable participation in the management of natural resources, youth empowerment and participation in environmental issues and halting illegal quarrying and pollution.

In relation to COP21, civil society generally supported the SIDS/CARICOM position. The CYEN Trinidad and Tobago chapter was supportive of the position of the CYEN chapter of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) on global climate change in general,

and COP21 in particular: support for limiting global temperature to 1.5°C, sanctions for countries that violate their CO2 emissions quota; greater effort towards substituting fossil fuels with renewable energy; and more opportunities for young people to participate in and contribute to climate change processes. CANARI expressed similar support for the SIDS position, stating that it represents climate justice.

Target Audience of CSOs

Civil society organizations generally target citizens in local communities, with fewer targeting policy makers at the national, regional and global levels. Groups with an activist orientation such as the IAMovement and CYEN, in addition to national constituencies, have worked with global CSOs to target international negotiators. COPE and CANARI target their outreach and strategies at a wide range of actors, including rural communities, government departments, academic institutions and other locally-based community organizations; while also working with regional and international partners and funders, particularly, the Global Environment Fund (GEF) and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC). Others, like the CYEN, are affiliated to global funding institutions.

Civil Society Participation in Climate Change

Type of Engagement

Civil society organizations are generally participating in climate change processes in three main ways: broad-based political action; advocacy, education and awareness building; and technical work related to research and training. All groups are participating in at least two of the above. We provide some illustrations below.

The work of the CYEN spans all three areas outlined above. According to the CYEN website, "the network has frequently sourced and financed short-term training scholarships for youth to attend leadership and other training courses. Beyond this, [it] has been actively involved in advocacy as well as environmental education and public awareness programmes" (CYEN, n.d.). The CYEN has been engaged in several initiatives, not only to sensitize citizens, particularly the youth, of the climate change issues confronting the Caribbean and the significance of COP21 but also to generate "ground level" recommendations for consideration by CARICOM negotiators. One such workshop 'Climate Change and You: The SIDS Reality' hosted by CYEN Trinidad and Tobago in December 2014, was part of a broader

Caribbean media and youth workshop on water security and climate resilience organized by the Global Water Partnership. CYEN Trinidad and Tobago supported the CYEN St. Lucia chapter in the '1.5 to Stay Alive' campaign for COP21, as part of the wider SIDs-CSO coalition in support of the St Lucia Ministry of Sustainable Development's Regional Climate Justice campaign.

The IAMovement is also engaged in all categories exclusive of training. The group hosted a broad-based activist event, the "People's Climate March" ahead of the Paris 2015 meeting, which also took place simultaneously in other parts of the world. Dubbed the 'POStoParis People's Climate March,' it took place on the eve of COP21. The IAMovement also engages in education and awareness-raising through sharing their message at various fora and collaborating with like-minded groups. They also engage in research such as feasibility studies on renewable energy to determine the cost to make Tobago completely renewable. This research is used, for example, to raise awareness among the population through postings on its websites and at workshops, for presentations at the people's climate march in 2014, and speaking engagements and interviews.

Other groups, while supportive of progressive/activist types of engagement, may focus on research and education to sensitize the general public and inform policy-making. One such example is the Cropper Foundation, internationally recognized for its conservation efforts in Trinidad and Tobago. The organization contributed to the regional plan for climate change education in the Caribbean as part of a more comprehensive United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) imperative to improving understanding of climate change issues through education. This plan is included in UNESCO's 2015 Report on the Expert Meeting on Climate Change Education for Sustainable Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNESCO 2015). Another group that is involved in a combination of advocacy, education, and capacity building is the Sans Souci Wildlife and Tourism Development Organization (SWATDO). Other groups engage in technical work only, focusing on research, training and capacity building; CANARI is one such example.

Noteworthy is the fact that the work of CSOs in this area is not limited to climate change but is situated within a broader environmental context and overall national social and economic development agenda. According to CSO respondent A, "what we're focusing on is not just the big world climate but it is also on the local, environmental and social economic impacts of decisions that we have to make."[3] Similarly, CSO respondent B noted that while the more discussed issues of rising sea levels and climate variability are recognized as key elements of the climate change discourse, the group's immediate focus is on the negative

effects of unregulated or illegal mineral extraction on watersheds and ecosystems, which can alter not just climate patterns in the long term, but economic and social activity.[4]

Strategies/Methods CSOs Employ to Achieve Objectives

The use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and social media is a common approach used by organizations to carry out their work. For example, CSO Respondent A noted that he is part of an international petition website, Avaaz,[5] where he became aware of the global people's climate march.[6] CYEN regularly tweets updates on events they are involved in, and posts feeds on Facebook. Similarly, Asa Wright, Cropper Foundation, COPE and IAMovement utilize websites, Facebook and email as part of their social media outreach. One organization, with funding from the GEF Small Grants Programme, produced a film in 2013, highlighting various ways in which climate change impacted three communities in Trinidad and Tobago.[7]

Civil society organizations collaborate with international CSOs and participate in global forums. Examples of such collaboration include the IAMovement's affiliation with Avaaz and CYEN Trinidad's partnership with the World Wide Views on Climate Change and Energy and the Global Call for Climate Action (GCCA). In some instances, as is the case of Avaaz, these links are global in scope, loosely constructed and have a progressive/activist orientation. The CYEN Trinidad and Tobago participated in the "Adopt a Negotiator" program through its partnership with the GCCA which resulted in the former's attendance as a Youth Climate Tracker at the COP21. Through these affiliations, Trinidad and Tobago CSOs are globally connected with persons and groups with a similar vision who can offer support to their cause and provide a global platform to voice issues.

CSOs also collaborate with organizations at the regional and national levels. Regionally, the CYEN is a member of the Caribbean Policy Development Centre and partners with agencies such as the Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development and the Caribbean Conservation Association (CCA). In the case of the former, collaboration involves joint participation in capacity-building activities, while collaboration with CCA involves assistance with funding and capacity-building.

Civil society organizations collaborate in different ways, ranging from information sharing to jointly executing projects. CYEN Trinidad and Tobago for example, collaborates with Papa Bois Conservation, the IAMovement and Sustain T&T mainly at the level of information sharing, promoting awareness, contributing to and participating in activities

of mutual interest. Caribbean Natural Resources Institute collaborates with Panos Caribbean and the CYEN, in the case of the former, jointly implementing projects and the latter, assisting with capacity-building.

Collaboration with governments, intergovernmental bodies and multi-stakeholder development agencies tends to be to: establish legitimacy with relevant actors and bridge relations among these actors; secure funding for various projects; access technical support; conduct research, capacity-building and information and knowledge sharing. The Cropper Foundation's partnership with UNESCO is a pertinent example of how NGO-IGO partnerships could be beneficial for education and capacity building. The IAMovement collaborated with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the EU and the French Embassy to host the People's Climate March 2015. The CYEN's affiliation with the Global Water Partnership is another such example. CYEN also partners with the UNDP in leadership development through the Tunza programme. CANARI collaborates with national governments in implementing projects and facilitating policy development. Other examples include the SWATDO's pilot project Sans Souci Climate Change Adaptation: Increasing the Resilience of the Community which received financial support from the GEF Small Grant UNDP,[8] Australian Aid, Office of Disaster Preparedness and Management: Disaster Management Unit/ Sangre Grande and the Environmental Management Authority (EMA).

Collaboration was also seen at the CARICOM level and in St. Lucia—the CARICOM Lead on climate change for COP21. Leading up to Paris 2015, regional and national CSOs partnered with CARICOM and the government of St Lucia to promote the region's position at COP21. For example, Panos Caribbean worked with the CCCCC, the Government of Saint Lucia and regional literary, visual and performing artists to promote the trailblazing '1.5 to Stay Alive' campaign to raise awareness of climate change issues affecting the Caribbean. With support provided by the Caribbean Development Bank and the Republic of France (Martinique regional government), the campaign featured the launch of a website; the creation of new artistic works for the occasion and live musical, theatrical and other performances, both at the country level and at the COP21 venue in Paris. These initiatives were supported by the St Lucia CYEN, which organized several activities including panel discussions, distribution of '1.5 to Stay Alive' pins, submission of a COP21 petition and successfully lobbying for a CYEN representative to be part of the Saint Lucia delegation. In the aftermath of the conference, CYEN St Lucia, working with the Government of Saint Lucia, convened three national meetings at which the Minister with responsibility for climate change, other negotiators and technocrats, informed the

audience about the outcomes of COP21. Panos Caribbean, CYEN and other organizations, supported by CARICOM governments continue to examine possibilities for sustaining the '1.5 to Stay Alive' effort to ensure that Caribbean audiences remain sensitized and become increasingly empowered to take action on climate change.[9]

We assess the effectiveness of CSO engagement and strategies by outlining the challenges they faced and assessing the impact they have had at various levels on climate change issues and the outcome of COP21.

Challenges of Civil Society Engagement

Below, we outline several challenges surrounding civil society organizations' engagement in the case under study.

First, civil society organizations tend to work in silos. In Trinidad and Tobago, there are indications that CSOs have a (limited) working relationship among themselves. The umbrella NGO, COPE, acts as a facilitator for disseminating information to its membership. There have also been instances of collaboration, such as CYEN providing volunteers for Sustain T&T's Green Screen event, or various CSOs participating in IAMovement's climate march. Overall though, groups are largely working in isolation. Based on responses we ascertained that CSOs worked in silos, and information, rather than being freely shared, was treated like a commodity.[10] This view is corroborated by CSO respondent A: "Everybody […] is scattered about, […and] have [no] national strength." Another respondent stated, "lots of people [are] doing similar projects with similar goals. Therefore, they should collaborate more."[11]

A second challenge uncovered was competition for funding. The display of individualistic behavior mentioned above may have resulted from heightened competition for scarce resources, particularly international project funding amongst NGOs. Such competition often occurs despite the establishment of a national Green Fund, the ostensible purpose of which is to "financially assist organizations and community groups that are engaged in activities related to the remediation, reforestation, environmental education and public awareness of environmental issues and conservation of the environment" (Ministry of Legal Affairs Trinidad and Tobago 2014). However, in an assessment of the Fund for the period 2010-2014, CSO respondent B noted that the majority of the funding goes to the EMA. Additionally, CSO respondent E cited that the application process for funding was complicated, and therefore discouraging.[12]

A third challenge stems from a general apathy among the general population because of Trinidad and Tobago's dependence on oil. The public seems to be apprehensive about speaking out against

climate change measures because Trinidad and Tobago is economically dependent on fossil fuels. There is a perception that being from an oil producing country and speaking up on GHG are incompatible. CSO respondent A indicated that the above perception was a consideration when establishing his group and stated further, "we felt [originally] it was not our right to talk about climate change…[because] we live off … oil…when they hear people talk about renewable, they think 'we have oil, ignore!" This sentiment holds true for the general population.

A fourth challenge is the limited opportunities that CSOs have had for influencing national and regional policy. Notably, all respondents admitted that they have little impact on policy at the national level, and on regional positions in preparation for the COP21. CSO respondent F admitted that this might have resulted from the group not maintaining the contact that was established previously by one of its members with the government. However, it should be noted that the organization has expressed a desire to work more closely with the government in pursuing its adaptation and mitigation initiatives. Some civil society actors appear to be interested in working on more localized climate-related projects rather than influencing global decisions on the subject. Their ties to global networks appear to be supportive, for the most part, of these specific objectives. Their aim seems to be to embark on climate change projects as part of an overall scheme to foster sustainable development within their communities.

Fifth, civil society organizations are challenged by the lack of formal processes for their participation at the regional level. Although the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society provides a policy framework for civil society participation in the development process, the Charter is not legally binding and has neither been incorporated into the juridical structure of CARICOM nor made national law. CARICOM member states are therefore under no obligation to include CSOs in policy-making processes. Notwithstanding the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society, one interviewee lamented the reality of restrictions CARICOM placed on NGOs' views and positions and noted that CARICOM's lack of interest in efforts that do not afford political mileage has also contributed to this lack of impact. Consequently, some CSOs have opted to use global civil society spaces in an attempt to impact policy.

A sixth challenge is a general lack of trust and accountability between CSOs and policy makers. The general secretive and sensitive nature of negotiations makes it difficult for policy makers to meaningfully engage with civil society. CSO respondent C surmised that decision-makers are fearful of negotiating positions being divulged to international collaborators and for this reason they withhold information from CSOs. There is also the view that decision-makers are concerned that meaningful engagement with NGOs will make them more accountable to the

public.[13] This challenge is perhaps illustrated by Trinidad and Tobago's exclusion of civil society on the government delegation to COP21 and their lack of engagement with CSOs at the meeting.

Impact of the Work of Civil Society

CSOs' work may be having the greatest impact at the individual (ground) level, that is, in the area of public education and raising awareness of climate change issues. Respondents reported that their work is changing attitudes and mind sets and providing a platform or space for people who are already interested in climate change to act and participate. Some NGOs seem to have had more success at engaging policy makers at the national level on more general environmental issues, sometimes being asked to serve on national committees. In Trinidad and Tobago some COPE members provide technical input for government-established steering committees on a wide range of environment-related issues including deforestation, quarrying, coastal management and reduction of carbon emissions. COPE was also represented in talks in Trinidad and Tobago ahead of COP21 and takes part in climate-related meetings.[14] Yet there was no CSO presence in the official Trinidad and Tobago delegation to the COP21. While the situation is more detached in Trinidad and Tobago, with some CSOs providing mainly technical inputs via membership on government-commissioned committees, they are relegated mainly to the outreach of narrow community or project-based activities.

The situation was notably different in St Lucia partly because it was the focal point for the CARICOM's COP21 preparations—St Lucia's Sustainable Development Minister's served as the Chair of the CARICOM Task Force on Climate Change. Also, St. Lucia's position as the headquarters of the OECS grouping whose economies depend almost exclusively on resources at extreme risk from climate change, may have led them to embrace the expertise of CSOs to boost their position vis-à-vis powerful interests at COP21. The St Lucian government worked closely with the CYEN St Lucia chapter and other local CSOs who provided technical inputs to the draft CARICOM position for COP21, and they became a valuable network for information dissemination and building widespread public awareness of the significance of climate change to the region.

At the CARICOM level, it is difficult to say with certainty, what impact CSOs had on policy and COP21. Furthermore, views on the subject are conflicting. For instance, CSO respondent C indicated that CARICOM's position was a reflection of the wider AOSIS position and was not developed with input from Caribbean CSOs,[15] while another stated

that the AOSIS/CARICOM position "was widely discussed for many years in many fora with civil society involvement, including, Caribbean civil society."[16] CARICOM civil society consultation in the formulation of regional positions for environment-related meetings, such as the High-level Symposium on Sustainable Development, Barbados 2015 and the COP20, Peru 2014, seems to support the latter view. However, another respondent lamented that CSO participation is mainly a "public relations exercise and CSOs do not know whether their views are taken onboard and incorporated in policy positions." According to CSO respondent C, their role, "is mostly… consultative... I cannot say what they do with their information after... we do provide our input but afterward from what I have seen, it is usually like a checkbox… that they have engaged civil society but at the end of the day, they make the decision."[17] These contrasting positions could mean two things: asymmetry in the level of engagement of Caribbean CSOs on issues of regional concern or varied perceptions, expectations and awareness of how positions should be developed at the CARICOM level concerning climate change.

COP21 was a litmus test for gauging Caribbean CSO participation in international climate change decision-making because of its high-level nature and the high stakes at play. Caribbean countries with CSOs on delegations to COP21 included, St. Lucia, Grenada,[18] Jamaica, Barbados and Guyana, all being youth representatives, the majority from CYEN national chapters. It must be noted that two CSO representatives from Trinidad and Tobago attended COP21. Reports suggest that the Trinidad and Tobago government delegation was not "receptive" to civil society engagement. CSO respondent C stated, in contrast, that there was meaningful interaction with negotiators from other Caribbean countries.[19]

At the international level, it is challenging to discern whether Caribbean civil society influenced the process and the degree to which they did. First, the basic Caribbean civil society position of limiting global warming to 1.5° C was shared by many others at COP21. Second, some groups were not part of CARICOM states' delegations at COP21. We make two observations: First, some Caribbean CSOs, arguably, played a very active role in advancing the 1.5 message in support of the AOSIS/CARICOM position. This boosted the position of CARICOM and AOSIS in the Paris climate talks. In fact, a CSO delegate at COP21 reported that they assumed the informal role of the AOSIS representative. Second, Caribbean CSOs and others from AOSIS countries assisted governments in challenging the mainstream position of restricting the rise in temperature to below 2 degrees Celsius. Civil society organizations', principally youth groups, provided support by promoting the 1.5 target, hosting protests and signing petitions to show their dissatisfaction with the draft text during the negotiations.

CSO respondent C stated that civil society had a positive impact on the negotiations; the agreement was frequently modified based on disagreements illustrated by CSO demonstrations and petitions, as well as the media which amplified civil society voices, such as the change from 2 degrees to 1.5. [20] Additionally, the mere presence of CSOs at the meeting helped to keep governments accountable and served as a form of soft pressure to sign a deal.

We use the work of one scholar to make sense of CSO participation in climate change processes in the case under study. According to Irvin and Stansbury (2004), when an issue is of high significance and even critical to stakeholders, among other considerations, participation is promoted. In this case, we observe that though climate change is very important, even posing an existential threat to ordinary people, in the long term, this has not been matched by a commensurate level of participation in Trinidad and Tobago. It seems that while there is a long-term threat, short term material interests—Trinidad and Tobago's dependence on oil—may be adversely affecting the government's willingness to include civil society and broad-based, mass participation in climate change discussions. Participation in climate change discussions in the case of this paper is not high despite the existence of other factors which have been found to facilitate engagement. According to Irvin and Stansbury (2004), these include: when the initiative does not require understanding of complex technical information and when the government is not attempting to validate a particular position in the face of public opposition or pressure. In this instance, the impact of global warming on livelihoods does not require technical knowledge and there was no public opposition towards Trinidad and Tobago's (and the wider Caribbean) stance in COP21.

According to Irvin and Stansbury (2004), the following serve as costs to participation: first, when there is apathy among the population and second, when the public is not aware of existing alternatives. The first aligns with our observations. As one of the interviewees in Trinidad and Tobago noted, there is a general sense that the discussions surrounding climate change are not in line with their interests and may damage their economic wellbeing. However, in relation to awareness of alternatives, we argue that citizens need more than knowledge of the alternatives. Whereas persons may be aware of alternative sources of energy—such as renewable energy—the cost and uncertainty about the benefits of the alternatives is also a consideration in determining whether persons would promote these alternatives and by extension pursue meaningful engagement to promote them. While the threat of the submersion of some SIDS by rising sea levels is real and has already happened in the Pacific region, perhaps the lack of widespread awareness of this phenomenon

has contributed to the lack of urgency as well as the commensurate measure of participation that is warranted. If there were existing cases or more immediate threats in the Caribbean region, it might have been treated with greater urgency and driven greater popular participation. While participation is fueled by the degree to which persons are affected by an issue, intervening variables could include: perceived severity of the problem and the duration of time it will take to be affected by the problem. For example, more people will participate if a problem affects them in the immediate future, rather than the next generation.

Conclusions

Below, we reflect on the implications of this research for democratic legitimacy and sustainable policy-making and propose civil society collaboration with global progressive networks as an avenue for efforts towards advancing climate justice.

Although CSOs can apply pressure on decision-makers outside of official processes, the use of official spaces is necessary for democratizing and legitimizing formal decision-making processes and fostering empowerment and ownership. In general, CSOs have been most active at the community level, and many see themselves as change agents, helping to sensitize the population and increase awareness among citizens. In Trinidad and Tobago, notwithstanding CSOs role in education and awareness building, there were few opportunities for direct input into the country's preparation, and CSOs were not part of the government's official presence at COP21. The lack of juridical status of the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society and the absence of a permanent institutionalized mechanism for civil society participation at the regional level contribute to existing challenges at the national level.

In contrast to Trinidad and Tobago, some elements of national and regional civil society worked with the government of St Lucia, which was the CARICOM Lead in preparation for COP21. In this instance, civil society and the government were on the same page with respect to championing climate justice at COP21; however, there could be instances where they hold different positions. The convergence of the views and ideals of both government and civil society in these cases may suspend questions about a democratic deficit. However, this should not obscure the need to institutionalize civil society participation within official decision-making processes as envisioned by the CARICOM Civil Society Charter as there is no guarantee that this effort will be sustained (especially in instances where civil society and government ideas may differ) or translated to other issue areas and other jurisdictions. The lack of formalized structures in CARICOM discourages participation at the

national and regional levels and may cause policymakers to be selective about what issues, when and whom they involve in decision-making. The potential of civil society, while tacitly acknowledged, has not been fully realized, considering the promise that meaningful engagement holds for CARICOM citizens, the state, democracy, good governance and sustainable development outcomes as articulated in the CARICOM Charter of Civil Society.

Policy making is democratized when there is public awareness of issues of importance, when governments are made accountable, and the interests of various groups, including that of the marginalized are included. Genuine participation fosters ownership and empowerment, both of which are requirements for sustainable policy outcomes. Inadequate participation could lead to lack of support, protest or outright rejection of that policy. The above is in line with the theory of participatory democracy which argues that genuine participation results in acceptance and ownership of decisions and by extension contributes to more stable societies (see Pateman, 1970). Civil society participation can also strengthen policy substantively. Some CSOs are familiar with issues deemed critical by grassroots communities due to their close interaction with them. Some also have the expertise and knowledge acquired from working with international actors.

With reference to Onuf's (2013) assertion that civil society confrontation democratizes the state and a 'vigorous civil society' leads to good governance, Trinidad and Tobago civil society—whose efforts cannot be generally categorized as progressive—demonstrated that they can also be a space of contestation and resistance. This is illustrated by their challenge of the 2-degree Celsius marker at COP21 and actively engaging in the '1.5 to stay alive' campaign. Groups such as CANARI and the Cropper Foundation, which focus more on research, education and capacity building challenged the status quo by supporting alternatives to the position advanced by the more developed countries. However, this is not generally executed through large-scale progressive action. The few notable exceptions are youth-based CSOs such as CYEN and IAMovement, which, perhaps because they have tapped into dynamic global networks, tend to adopt a more overt activist stance in challenging the status quo and holding governments accountable.

The establishment of regional CSO networks and links with global civil society groups and processes demonstrate a dynamic and transnational, albeit limited dimension to Trinidad and Tobago civil society's engagement in global problems. The participation of civil society in global (progressive) coalitions could be beneficial for Trinidad and Tobago (and the wider CARICOM region) and its citizens for the following reasons: First, participation in these spaces could be a powerful force

for awakening the desired awareness of critical issues at the national and regional levels where this awareness is lacking. For example, in contexts where narrow, selfish and short-term interests dominate those that embrace a broader and longer-term view and which would lead to more sustainable outcomes, participation in global coalitions could support and strengthen the latter position. Second, transnational problems cannot be effectively addressed in isolation. With the causes and effects of climate change being particularly borderless—coupled with the market-oriented framework of the UNFCCC—, global collaboration with a progressive agenda for attaining climate justice is imperative.

Notes

[1] "Small Island Developing States (SIDS) were recognized as a distinct group of developing countries facing specific social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (3-14 June 1992)." Small Island Developing States are in three geographical regions: the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea (AIMS) (UN-OHRLLS 2018).

[2] The questionnaire consisted of background information on the organizations and its work and mainly short and open-ended questions.

[3] Interview by authors, November 12 and 19, 2015.

[4] Interview by authors, May 20, 24 and 25, 2015.

[5] Avaaz describes itself as "a global web movement bringing people-powered politics to decision-making everywhere." Its members total over 40 million "in every nation of the world." In the case of the World-Wide Views on Climate Change and Energy, it is a coalition consisting of organizations and networks from 91 countries globally.

[6] Interview by authors, November 12 and 19, 2015.

[7] CSO respondent D, interview by authors, November 24, 2015.

[8] The GEF which was created in the lead up to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit provides grants and secures financing for projects aimed at tackling pressing environmental issues. The GEF is an international partner with institutions, countries, CSOs and private sector in 183 countries <https://www.thegef.org>.

[9] CARICOM government official, interview by authors, March 14, 2016.

[10] CSO respondent B, interview by authors, May 20, 24 and 25, 2015.

[11] CSO respondent D, interview by authors, December 1, 2015.

[12] Interview by authors, November 25, 2015.

[13] Interview by authors, November 23, 2015.

[14] CSO respondent B, interview by authors, May 20, 24 and 25, 2015.

[15] CSO respondent C, interview by authors, November 23, 2015.

[16] CSO respondent F, interview by authors, November 22. 2015.

[17] Interview by authors, November 23, 2015.

[18] Two CYEN representatives

[19] Interview by authors, March 8, 2016.

[20] Interview by authors, November 23, 2015.

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