

World War 1 – Germany and Spain in the crucial year 1917

Michael Campbell Wolfmeyer
Departamento de Humanidades
UPR-Ponce

Abstract

The German High Command (OHL) and the Foreign Office (Aus Amt) searched for new military strategies in an attempt to bring the war to an end after the horrendous losses of 1916. Specifically, they were horrified by the inability to advance on the Western Front – the trenches. Although the navy was blockaded in port in Kiel, they hoped that submarines could severely hamper the war effort of the Entente Powers. An important supply line was through the Mediterranean, and after losing their alliance with Italy in 1915, they saw neutral Spain as a possible base for submarine operations. Neutral Spain would also be used as part of a spy ring aimed at damaging their enemies' war effort. The effort of the German authorities was a combination of diplomacy and covert actions to implement their plans. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the use of submarines and spies revealed Germany's desperate attempt to bring the Great War a quick end in 1917.

Key Words: Germany, Spain, Great War, Military strategies, Espionage

Resumen

El Alto mando alemán (OHL) y la Oficina de Relaciones Exteriores exploraron nuevas estrategias militares en su esfuerzo por poner fin a la guerra luego de las terribles pérdidas en 1916. Las trincheras les horrorizaron por la imposibilidad de ganar terreno en el frente occidental. A pesar del bloqueo naval en el puerto de Kiel, se mostraron esperanzados en la capacidad de los submarinos para impactar adversamente el esfuerzo de guerra de los poderes de la Entente. Luego de perder el apoyo de Italia en 1915 y dado el hecho de que una línea importante de suministros atravesaba el Mediterráneo. España, como nación neutral, podría desempeñar un rol importante en una cadena de espionaje diseñada para impactar adversamente el esfuerzo de guerra del enemigo. Las autoridades alemanas combinaron diplomacia y actividades secretas en la implementación de sus planes. A pesar de su eventual fracaso, el uso de submarinos y el espionaje evidenció los desesperados esfuerzos alemanes por terminar de manera rápida la Gran Guerra en 1917.

Palabras clave: Alemania, España, Gran Guerra, Estrategias militares, Espionaje

As one approaches the commemoration of one hundred years since the many deadly events of the First World War (known in its time as the “Great War”) we are reminded of the horrendous death and destruction of Europe and the World. I

(and many historians dealing with the 20th century) would argue that the world would never be the same. But this short essay intends to concentrate on the crucial year of 1917. The war would continue until the end of 1918, but both alliances of the war looked

to new tactics in 1917 in a frantic attempt to bring the bloodshed and destruction to an end.

Germany and Spain may seem an unusual matching, but in this crucial year of the war their relations appeared critical. Germany was the lead of the Central Powers (with Austria and the Ottoman Empire); and Spain was officially neutral although – at the beginning of 1917 - their Prime Minister Conde de Romanones was in favor of joining the Entente Powers (Great Britain, France and Russia). Germany would place submarines and espionage at the center of their “desperate” strategy to end the war; which meant that Spain would be designated as crucial to their plans. Some World War I background and description of strategies will be included in order to make sense of the specifics of 1917.

When one reflects upon the notion of German espionage in World War I, one usually considers the Zimmerman Telegram or the mischievous adventures of Mata Hari. Although each of these was a purported essential part of the German war effort; there was additional espionage activity during this struggle. The subtle combination of espionage and submarines requires that one knows at least a few of the aspects of the spy ring which was centralized in Spain. Spain’s strategic location, with access to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean; as well as its neutral stance throughout the war made it an important center of German espionage.

Several key aspects will need clarification in order to make this essay more understandable. The changing conditions of the war, especially in terms of access to raw materials by the Central Powers, made access to foreign sources important. Beginning in the Spring of 1915 when the Mediterranean power – Italy – changed from the Central Powers to the Entente Powers. The successful British

blockade of the German ports, pushed the German government to the irreversible decision to undertake “unconditional submarine warfare” in early 1917. This decision necessitated better relations with the Spanish government and at a crucial moment nearly severed the relations between the governments of Spain and Germany. The growing intensity of the war, along with the increasing shortages in Germany, pushed them to extreme measures.

Central to these considerations are also the personalities which ordered or carried out the policies. Prince Ratibor, German Ambassador to Spain, was both an arrogant aristocrat and generally kept in the dark concerning the activities of German espionage. His two military advisors, Captain Kalle and Naval-attache von Krohn, were the central figures in the espionage activities in the Iberian Peninsula. The King of Spain, Alfonso XIII, found Prince Ratibor and von Krohn to be boorish, but developed a friendship with the only non-aristocrat Kalle. There were also the spies themselves; among the most famous to receive their orders from the Spanish headquarters were “Arnold” and “Jakob”. The exploits of these men, although, not as glamorous as Mata Hari, played an important role in the German war effort, especially in the crucial year of 1917.

When the “Great War” broke out in August 1914 few of the contemporaries envisioned a protracted conflict. Governments and soldiers talked of being home by Christmas celebrating their victory. With this attitude in mind it is not surprising that in the initial phase of the war the German government paid little attention to the neutrals, such as Spain. A quick march to Paris (recalling the Franco-Prussian War 1870-1) was to be followed by a thrashing of the Russian troops. (The German Schlieffen Plan utilized this strategy and was familiar

to both the allies and the adversaries of Germany.) The general consensus in Germany was that their superiority in strategy and military capability would guarantee a war of short duration.

One early concern of the French government was their African colonies and the French troops stationed there, especially Morocco. Spain seemed to be the logical answer to this dilemma as the possible route to transport troops from the French colonies to their homeland. In 1913, as the pending war appeared imminent, the French government advanced a plan for the construction of an electric railroad from the southern coast of Spain to the Pyrenees. The plan did not, according to the French officials, endanger Spanish neutrality; while providing the French with a future line of communication once the inevitable war began.¹ The Spanish government evaluated the plan and determined that such a communication line would endanger their neutral status (and sovereignty) and thus rejected the proposal. Although this decision obviously followed the wishes of the German ambassador Ratibor; the final decision appeared to be based strictly on Spain's desire to avoid being dragged into the pending conflict.

As the war began Spain's position in 1914 cannot be stated as a clear preference for the Entente or Central Powers. The general political split placed the liberal and anti-clerical factions on the side of the British and French; while the absolutist and clerical supporters backed the German and Austrian alliance. In terms of trade, the British-French alliance accounted for roughly half of all Spanish exports and 36% of their imports. Germany could only claim 10% and 5% respectively in the area of trade. In the decade of the First World War Spain's growing economy relied heavily on foreign investments from both sides, but

Britain and France accounted for roughly three-fourths of the investments.² In terms of the military, German influence was stronger as a number of Spanish officers had trained on German soil (the Charlottesburg War College). The numerous variables left no clear cut preference for either the Spanish populace or its government.

By the closing months of 1914 several incidents had affected the Spanish public opinion towards the two sides. The British had seized several Spanish merchant ships, under the pretext that they were carrying aid to the Central Powers. In early 1915 the British and French merchant marines would also begin flying Spanish flags in order to appear as neutrals, and thereby endanger all Spanish ships of possible German attacks.³ On the German side there was the invasion of Belgium, which included damage to several Catholic churches. Also in Brussels, there was the destruction of the statue dedicated to the memory of the Spanish anarchist and educator Francisco Ferrer. These initial events just seemed to heighten the polarization in Spain.

The first major shift in the balance of power in the war would occur in the spring of 1915. Italy, formally an ally of Germany, which had declared its neutrality at the beginning of hostilities, would now join the Entente Powers.⁴ In terms of land forces this change of alliance was more of a concern for the Austrians; but it also altered the naval situation of the Mediterranean. German U-boats and submarines, were attempting to disrupt the trade between England and their colonies – especially Egypt and India. The defection of Italy took away strategic Mediterranean bases of operation in this disruption of trade. This particular factor would add additional importance to neutral Spain's strategic location in terms of its Mediterranean coast.

At the end of February 1915 the Spanish Cortes closed – a result of impending elections – and the nation’s political leaders were deprived of this forum for their debate over the war. As foreign pressures to gain a commitment mounted, these politicians felt compelled to present their views on this matter to the public. During the months of April and May a widely publicized series of speeches were presented by the major political factions. The Liberal Conde de Romanones opened the debate extolling his vehemently pro-Entente position by emphasizing that Spain’s foreign policy interests and indeed entire future lay with the Entente Powers.⁵ Conservative leader Antonio Maura presented his pro-German views; while officially advocating a Central Power-leaning neutrality.⁶ The remainder of speakers – Reform Party Melquiades Alvarez (pro-Entente), Radical Party Alejandro Lerroux (neutrality), and Carlist Vazquez de Mella (pro-Central) – challenged the position of neutrality as presented by Prime Minister Eduardo Dato.⁷ Not surprisingly the arrogant German Ambassador, Prince Ratibor, rejoiced in those who wanted Germany as an ally and dismissed the rest as bribed or misguided.⁸ It is not surprising, therefore, that although the Spanish position towards the war had been spelled out by all sides, the German Foreign Office believed that they could rely on Spain’s continued neutrality (if not more).

By the summer of 1915 German officials deemed it appropriate to challenge what they considered non-neutral activities by some Spanish shipping companies. Berlin felt that the time had arrived to enforce their blockade around the British Isles, even in the case of neutrals, like Spain. In August German U-Boats detained and searched neutral vessels, including Spanish ships within the contraband zone. Two Spanish steamers – the Isodoro and the Peña

Castillo – were deemed to be carrying conditional contraband, “minerals”. The Spanish crews were removed and returned to Spain, but the vessels were sunk.⁹ German authorities, who appear to have been relying on the German Ambassador’s evaluation of Spanish sentiment, had felt secure enough to carry out these actions against neutral Spain.

In the summer of 1915 it also became apparent that Germany needed additional means by which to obtain raw materials and arms for their war effort. This role, which had initially been handled by the Italian Foreign Minister San Guiliano until his death in October 1914, increasingly focused on Madrid. In the early summer of 1915 preparations were made to purchase one million pounds of gunpowder.¹⁰ This deal and others were not officially handled by the Spanish Monarch or the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. An even larger deal was planned beginning in August 1915 to buy a large arms shipment from the New York supplier Hecht and Hecht. This deal arranged with the aid of the Spanish Minister of War and the Spanish Ambassador in Washington, D.C., aroused British and French suspicions.¹¹ It was eventually quashed in February 1916 after a change in Spanish governments. The needs of the war, even as early as 1915, necessitated that Germany find means to keep their army supplied.

The strict neutral leadership of the Spanish Prime Minister, Eduardo Dato, was not guaranteed as both belligerents in the war increased their pressure for Spain to commit to the war. King Alfonso, who appreciated the decision making ability of Dato, could not shield him from the growing opposition to his policies and by December 1915 his Cabinet resigned. Dato’s replacement, the Liberal Conde de Romanones, was a vocal supporter of the Entente.¹² Over the next sixteen months the German authorities would face delicate and

difficult relations with the Spanish government.

1916 would be a test for both alliances with two large offenses on the Western Front, increased carnage on the Eastern Front, and one of the largest naval battles in history. On February 21 General Erich von Falkenhayn instigated the Battle of Verdun against the military fortresses protecting the French border. His strategy was to bleed the French white and the resilience of French General Philippe Petain to hold these fortresses at all costs would result in the longest battle – 303 days – and one of the deadliest – over 1 million casualties – of the war. At sea German submarines embarked on unrestricted attacks around the British Isles on March 1, sinking over 500,000 merchant tonnage (estimated to be more than could be replaced) until the campaign was halted on April 24 in fear that other nations - especially the United States - would enter the war. The only real naval Battle of Jutland began on May 31 and lasted only two days. The victory in the battle went to Germany which sunk 14 vessels along with over 6,000 dead and only lost 11 vessels along with over 2,500 dead; but the impact was that Britain tightened the blockade around Germany and the German fleet never ventured out again during the war. By July 1 British General Haig initiated the Battle of the Somme to relieve some of the pressure from Verdun. In the initial week the British suffered 60,000 casualties and by the battle's end on November 18 there would be nearly a million casualties.¹³ The year 1916 proved to be the deadliest year thus far of the war.

The year 1916 offered a number of difficulties for the German Foreign Office in terms of its policies towards Spain. Declining military fortunes for the Central Powers as well as the vehemently pro-Entente Spanish Prime Minister resulted in several incidents. The first one concerned

the actual destination of English coal being transported aboard Spanish ships; with German officials claiming that these cargoes were often unloaded either in France or Italy.¹⁴ In mid-April, Germany nearly pushed Spain into the war on the side of the Entente when two Spanish steamers, the *Vigo* and the *Santanderino*, were sunk.¹⁵ Prime Minister Ramonones was nearly able to turn these incidents into a cause sufficient to push Spain into the war. A letter from Kaiser Wilhelm to King Alfonso XIII which emphasized Germany's desire for peace and the crucial role of the Spanish Monarch in the peace process, carried aboard an ultra-modern submarine U-35, calmed Spanish popular opinion temporarily. When this letter was published and Germany promised to replace the sunken vessels, Spanish rancor subsided.¹⁶ Military-attaché Kalle, striking a somewhat different chord, noted that the military shortcomings of the German Army in the summer of 1916 were the largest detriment to keeping Spain from joining the Entente Powers.¹⁷

By September the German officials struggled to keep the war effort moving forward. During this month, the second incident occurred when a German U-boat sank a Spanish steamer, *Luis Vives* which carried conditional contraband, fruit. Although technically valid, German authorities quickly found themselves the target of a campaign which cited them as attempting to destroy the Spanish economy.¹⁸ It was not until the second half of October, with Spanish belligerency seeming ever closer to becoming a reality, that German officials struck upon an idea to finally defuse the *Luis Vives* issue. German Under State Secretary von Langwerth offered an interview to the Associated Press announcing that:

Fruit steamers ... are good prizes ...
[but] Germany offered to let such
ships pass unmolested if provided

with proper certificates from German consuls and if Allies permit similar cargoes – ship for ship to the German market.¹⁹

This publicity act of neutrality and fairness defused the issue and finally broke Spain's popular notion that they should enter the conflict. The military fronts had also taken a turn for the better, success on the Somme Front (France) as well as in Russia and Rumania, aided in improved relations between Berlin and Madrid.

Although militarily remaining dominant, by 1917 German war efforts and shortages of consumer and military supplies became more desperate. This year witnessed a further decline in German – Spanish relations, even though the Ramonones Cabinet fell in April. The largest single military decision of the war was the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1. This calculated risk was aimed at a quick and victorious resolution to the war. Although it was deemed an aggressive act which would be condemned, the German High Command felt that it could break the stalemate of the Western Front trenches. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that there was also an increased volume of spy activity, as well as increased action against espionage.

The Unrestricted Submarine Warfare declared by Germany on February 1, 1917 would have significant impact on the war. The German High Command hoped that by sinking 600,000 tons of British merchant vessels for six months they could paralyze the British economy. With 105 operational submarines they sought to force the British to surrender or starve. Sinkings exceeded 500,000 tons from February to August and reached their peak in April with over 860,000 tons. However, Atlantic shipping organized in large, well protected convoys

making attacks more difficult. The result was that Mediterranean targets coming from Egypt and India increased, thus amplifying the importance of Spain for unofficial bases for submarines.²⁰ Although successful in sinking of ships, the unrestricted submarine policy failed to sink the British economy and was influential in the entrance of the United States to the war in April. There was a significant price in submarines lost and those forced out of service with mechanical problems.

Spain's role in the increased espionage activity took on two distinctive roles. One dealt with the German U-boats, especially concerning their activities in the Mediterranean. This was the responsibility of the Naval-attaché, von Krohn, who was to control movements of the valuable submarines. The Spanish coast was used as a base for several U-boats needing assistance or making deliveries. The other aspect was the orders sent out to spies roaming throughout Europe, the Americas, and elsewhere. Spanish neutrality aided in German access to these important silent warriors. Kalle was in charge of controlling their orders and passing instructions on their missions. Often messages and instructions arrived to Kalle via Ambassador Lucius based in Stockholm, Sweden.

The unrestricted submarine warfare exacerbated two areas of concern for the Spanish government. First, it called into question the safety of the shipments from and to Spain, the lion's share of which travelled to the Entente Powers. Spanish concern for the shipment of foodstuffs, as a non-belligerent product, was in part answered by the German concession of a few shipping corridors.²¹ The other issue was the shipping tonnage, already insufficient prior to the German policies and the reality of facing German torpedoes. The German solution to this problem developed, rather than being struck upon immediately.

The Spanish economy, which should have prospered more in its role as supplier to all the belligerents, was hampered by the unavailability of sufficient cargo space.

At the end of February two additional events further aggravated pro-Entente Spaniards. On the night of the 18th a German citizen by the name of Harry Wand was apprehended by Spanish authorities. In his possession he had thirty boxes of supplies earmarked for a submarine. Wand falsely identified himself as an American named Wood, although under further interrogation he would confess his true identity. Wand also asked to see the German consul at Cartagena, Herr Meyer, this brought both the Consul and the port under suspicion. Several days later a German submarine was interned by Spanish authorities in the port of Cartagena, apparently identified as the transport for the thirty boxes. During the internment of Wand, a second German citizen, Wilhelm Kallen was arrested in Madrid for his involvement in the supplying of submarines at Cartagena.²² Ambassador Ratibor would warn that Spanish authorities would be scrutinizing German activities and forbade the use of coded radio messages between provincial representatives – a policy detrimental to Germany because of its numerous consulates throughout Spain. On the other hand, Ratibor breathed a sigh of relief when he informed Berlin that none of the coded messages among the seized materials had been decoded.²³ Additionally, the submarine which had been interned in Cartagena had been allowed to escape, which further aroused Spanish ire.

Several days later, on the 23rd, another German U-boat entered the port of Cartagena. This time, however, the submarine would not be allowed to escape, and Spanish authorities interned the vessel and its crew. Naval-attaché von Krohn

informed the German Ambassador that the craft's cargo included important "containers".²⁴ Among the documents were instructions for Military-attaché Kalle. King Alfonso XIII and Ramonones summoned Ratibor, Fuerstenberg, and Kalle to explain the Central Power's actions. Fortunately for the German officials the contents of the submarine were not released to the press, because the U-boats cargo also included a cache of explosives.²⁵ The German Foreign Office accepted that they probably were better off not trying to force Spain to release the submarine or return its contents. This they hoped would avoid arousing suspicion for the Spanish press.

German desperation was obvious far afield with the sending of the coded Zimmermann Telegram in January 1917. This offer of German assistance for the recapturing of former Mexican lands now controlled by the United States (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California) in exchange for preoccupying the United States from entering the war in Europe. Germany was forced to use the only connection to Washington and their ambassador there which was the British undersea cable. British cryptographers received and eventually decoded the message. Mexico, in the midst of its decade long revolution (1910 – 1920), saw its President Venustiano Carranza reject the idea. The central government was more concerned about its internal enemies of Pancho Villa in the north and Emiliano Zapata in the south. However, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States would use this conspiracy to add weight to the case for the United States' entry into the First World War.

Several additional factors influenced the emotions of the Spanish public and the divided political factions. In March, Russia found itself in turmoil with a revolution that would seriously limit the Czar's power. The

following month the United States would join the Entente Powers. That same month Romanones would offer his resignation in the hope of forcing Spain to accept his view that the time had come to enter the war. Even though the majority of politically active Spaniards felt that the German submarine policies, especially “unrestricted warfare” were detrimental to the Spanish economy; they did not link it directly to pro-Entente action. Spain’s neutrality – as advocated by Maura, Dato, and King Alfonso XIII – was seen as the best alternative for the moment. The Entente Powers increased pressure on Spain to join them in the war.

In the last week of the Romanones Cabinet, two Germans were detained for espionage. One, of minimal importance, was released under his own recognizance. The other, “Robert”, was initially charged by the United States Ambassador as a deserter from the United States military. Although he was able to deny the charges presented by Ambassador Willard, he was arrested by Spanish authorities as an unregistered German citizen. The detainment of “Robert”, Heinrich Bode, offers an insight into one of the spies under the command of Kalle. Bode was born in Germany, raised in the United States, and worked as a mining engineer in Korea, China, Mongolia, Siberia, and Mexico. He served as a Russian spy in the Russo-Japanese War. “Captain” Bode had also worked with a group of Germans in the United States purchasing incendiary bombs from the Scheele bomb factory in Hoboken, New Jersey and placing them aboard oceangoing vessels headed for Entente Powers in order to destroy the ships at sea. In April 1917, eight Germans were placed on trial and found guilty of setting incendiary fires aboard oceangoing ships since 1915, however Bode was not among them as he was on a different mission in Spain. His reason for being in Spain was that he was on

his way back to Germany from Cuba via Spain.²⁶ Although he was able to gain his release by divulging this information and continue on to Germany; he was unable to complete the mission which had brought him to Spain and also lost his anonymity.

German U-boats would be returned as a concern for not damaging the relations between Madrid and Berlin. On June 11, this new policy was put into action when the German U-boat UC-52 arrived at the port of Cadiz claiming to have mechanical problems. Under protest by the Entente Powers, the Liberal Government of Garcia Prieto allowed the submarine commander ten days to repair the problem and leave the port. The repairs were completed on time, but the submarine sailed off secretly under cover of darkness. The unannounced departure’s true reason, for the submarine’s safety or to cover clandestine activities, was never established. The Entente pressure increased substantially and the King finally bent to the pressure and signed a decree against any German submarine entering Spanish territorial waters – under the penalty of being interned for the remainder of the war.²⁷ This policy, although obviously aimed against the German Navy, was accepted for fear that a vigorous protest could lead to even greater repercussions against Germany.

By the end of summer U-Boat activity was on the decline due to the toll – sinkings and mechanical problems - taken by intensified actions. In September two German U-boats, the UB-49 and UB-23, would be forced to enter the Spanish port of Cadiz due to mechanical problems. The UB-49 had a broken propeller shaft, while the UB-23 had more extensive damage; neither vessel could continue without repairs. The Spanish government, as decreed, interned the two submarines. The UB-23 had a substantial load of torpedoes, which German officials offered to purchase

from Spain. Against the opposition of von Krohn, the UB-49 commander installed the UB-23's propeller shaft and fled the Cadiz harbor.²⁸ This clear violation of Spanish law as well as the breaking of an officer's word of honor further cooled the already chilly relations between Germany and Spain.

The Entente protest over the Spanish "allowing" of the UB-49 to escape quickly reached Madrid. The British and French presented several demands on Spain as a means for Spain to prove their steadfast resolve to maintain neutrality. The requests included closer supervision of German espionage, halting of German press service transmissions, and – most disconcerting to Berlin – the recall of Naval-attaché von Krohn.²⁹ Although the Kaiser indicated that he would be willing to accept von Krohn's recall in exchange for guaranteed Spanish neutrality; the Admiral Staff vehemently objected to the arrangement. They not only wanted to protect their spy-master for naval affairs, but more importantly to assure that Spain would not use this as a precedent to remove Kalle.³⁰ German authorities recognized the importance of the mild mannered and friendly Kalle, the complete opposite of the arrogant von Krohn, in masterminding numerous acts of espionage and sabotage.

The Germans realized that there were additional means to impact the supplies arriving in Britain which were not just U-Boats. The German agent of special note, who reported directly to his handler Kalle was the notorious "A" or "Arnold". The British naval intelligence, known as Room 40, credited this spy with a long list of acts of sabotage, including: sabotaging shipping, introducing fungus into stored grain (earmarked for the Entente), inoculating mules with glanders, and promoting strikes harmful to Allied interests – all in Argentina.³¹ But German intelligence

documents indicate that Arnold's exploits were more extensive than the British imagined. He had traveled extensively during the war, as his expertise in explosives and toxicology made his services crucial for the war effort. Arnold's missions had taken him to the Americas from the United States in the north to Argentina in the south, as well as several missions in Europe. In August, Major Kalle would summon "A" to Spain to complete the assembly of Milchprufer (Milk Testers) and Bleistiften (Pencils), both of which were code names for explosive devices.³²

The trip to Spain would prove to be the last mission Arnold ever participated in. On August 20 the spy was reported to have left Buenos Aires on his way to Spain to receive further instructions from Kalle. His journey, however, was cut short. On October 3, Kalle informed Berlin that Arnold had been arrested and taken from his ship while in American waters.³³ Although neither his arrest nor trial were publicized, it can be assumed that the infamous international spy Arnold received the traditional punishment for espionage – execution.

The year 1917 had proved to be a very difficult one for German spies. The often mentioned A (Arnold), B (Heinrich Bode), C.(Jakob), as well as H-21 Mata Hari had all been identified and/or arrested. January had seen the arrest of C - Jakob an explosives expert. February 13 was the fateful day that Mata Hari had been arrested by the French and accused of aiding in the death of at least 50,000 Frenchmen by passing Entente secrets to the Germans. In April B - Heinrich Bode had been identified, although not formally charged, his anonymity had been lost. Finally, October had seen the arrest of A- Arnold putting an end to his terrorist activities. The German war effort was on the Eastern Front and in the trenches of the Western Front; however,

submarines and spies played an important role in trying to bring victory to Germany.

Notes:

Report from Ratibor to Bethmann Hollweg. Nr. 163. Dated 18 June 1913. Reel #356, Spanien 60: *Parlamentarische Angelegenheiten Spaniens*, #730 – 739.

² Juan Plaza Prieto. “El desarrollo del comercio exterior español desde principios del siglo XIX a la actualidad” *Revista de Economía Política* (mayo – agosto 1955, p. 49. See also Juan Vicens Vivies and Jorge Nadal Oller. *An Economic History of Spain*. 1969.

³ *El Imparcial* article “El bloqueo de Inglaterra” April 16, 1915. The article was on page 2, perhaps indicating that these ships operating in the North Sea were not a top priority for the Spanish public.

⁴ The Treaty of London was signed in April of 1915 and Italy would enter the war a month later.

⁵ The broadest coverage was in *A.B.C.*'s article “Los problemas Nacionales: El Partido Liberal” April 19, 1915, pages 10 – 11. *El Socialista*'s article “Ramonones en Baleares” of the same date carried a few brief quotations from the speech, page 2. *El Imparcial* and *La Epoca* told of the event and ignored the speech.

⁶ Not surprisingly the Spanish press reacted in the opposite to his speech; *El Imparcial* (April 22) and *La Epoca* (April 23) praised the speaker and somewhat the message; while *El Socialista* put their article “Maura, no” on the first page of their April 21 edition. Again the broadest coverage was by *A.B.C.* on April 22.

⁷ Michael T. Campebell “Triumph of the Word: The German Struggle to Maintain Spanish Neutrality during the First World War” Unpublished dissertation (UW – Madison, 1989), pages 131 – 133.

⁸ Telegram from Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 814. Dated 2 June 1915, 189-190. and Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 1381 Also dated 2 June 1915, 291. *Weltkrieg 11q* Geheim: Unternehmungen und Aufwiegungen gegen unsure Feinde in Spanien. Microfilm Reel #402.

⁹ The incident was recorded in various newspapers, including *La Epoca* in “La Perdida de los Buques Españoles”, August 22, 1915 page 2. Although indicating that the sinkings were lamentable, they were not considered sufficiently hostile to change Spanish neutrality.

¹⁰ Report from Kalle (military-attache) to Aus. Amt. (German Foreign Office) entitled: “Die Armee und die aussere Politik Spaniens. Dated 31 January 1914. Reel #358, Spanien 65: *Beziehungene zu Frankreich*, #645 – 648.

¹¹ Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 1202. Dated 19 August 1915. Reel #355/*Spanien* 44/ 501-502. and Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 1237. Dated 22 August 1915. Reel # 355/*Spanien* 44/ 502. The Spanish War Ministry wanted a delivery price of 5% profit and 2% above expenses. Concerning the British and French suspicions see Rosenow to Aus Amt. Nr. III.10. Dated 21 September 1915. Reel #355/*Spanien* 44/ 517-518. Rosenow was the personal representative of Hecht and Pfeiffer Co. in Berlin.

¹² Conde de Romanones, “Neutralidades que matan”, *El Diario Universal*, 19 August 1915. In this article he became the first critic of Spanish neutrality and said that Spain's only logical position in the war was as an ally of the Entente Powers.

¹³ For more details see Robin Prior “1916: Impasse” in *The Cambridge History of The First World War*, volume 1 edited by Jay Winter. Various articles in the *International Encyclopedia of the First World War* (on-line). See also History Learning Center, *History/ World War I, History First World War.com*.

¹⁴ Polo de Barnabe to von Jagow. Nr. 8420 and Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 754. Both dated 31 March 1916. Reel #357. *Spanien* 61: (geheim) *Die pollitischen Beziehungen zwischen Spanien und Deutschland*, 67-68, 76.

¹⁵ Ratibor to Aus Amt. No. 851. Dated 13 April 1916 and Jagow to Ratibor. Nr. 337. Dated 15 April 1916. Reel #357/*Spnien* 61/ 87, 92.

¹⁶ Letter from Kaiser Wilhelm to King Alfonso. Stamped 3 May 1916. Reel #34/ *Spanien* 61/ 119-120. Perhaps more important for defusing Spanish public opinion was the German announcement that they would replace the Spanish ships sunk in April.

¹⁷ Kalle to General Staff. No Number. Dated 29 May 1916. Reel#34/*Spanien* 61/ 139-141.

¹⁸ Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 309. Dated 15 September 1916 and Jagow to Admiral Staff. No Nr. Dated 16 September 1916. Reel #35/*Spanien* 61/ 100-101. On 28 September 1916 the Spanish press made this the featured issue in *La Epoca* “El problema de la navegación” and *El Imparcial* “Nuevos Conflictos”.

¹⁹ Berlin to Ratibor. Nr. 999. Dated 15 October 1916. Reel #35/*Spanien* 61/ 228.

²⁰ John Abbatiello “Atlantic U-boat Campaign” in *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*. He cites British figures of Entente and Neutral Shipping at 497,095 (february), 553,189 (march), 867,834 (april), 589,603(may), 674,458 (june), 545,021 (july), 509,142 (august).

²¹ Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 325. Dated 5 February 1917. and Admiral staff to Ratibor, Nr. 143. Dated 8 February 1917. Reel #38/ *Spanien* 61/ 228.

²² “La Pirateria Alemana” *El Socialista*. 21 February 1917. and “En las Costas Españolas” and “El aprovisionamiento de los submarinos alemanes” *La Epoca*. 21 and 24 February 1917 respectively. Ward

also had asked to see the German Consul at Cartagena, Herr Meyer, before being interned. This brought Meyer under Spanish suspicion as well.

²³ Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 165. Dated 27 February 1917. Reel #38/ Spanien 61/ 180 – 181. The inability to decode the documents was apparently a key issue, because among the correspondence was “Dispatch #150” which contained details over numerous official undertakings.

²⁴ Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 148. Dated 23 February 1917. Reel #402 Weltkrieg 11q/ 496. Klaus-Volker Giessler, *Die Institution des Marineattachés im Kaiserreich*. Boppard am Rhein, 1976, pp. 203-206.

²⁵ Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nrs. 167, 170. Dated 29 February, 1 March 1917; and Kalle to Aus Amt. No Nr. Dated 1 March 1917. Reel #402/ Weltkrieg 11q/ 468, 470-471, 483.

²⁶ Kalle to Aus Amt. Nr. 310 Dated 12 April 1917; Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 353. Dated 20 April 1917; General Staff to Aus Amt. Nr. Pol. 15638. Dated 25 April 1917; Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nr. 1302. 11 May 1917; and Report over Heinrich Bode’s Life No Nr. Or Date. Reel #402/ Weltkrieg 11q/ 534, 537, 538-539, 543.

²⁷ Willard to Lansing. Nr. 648. Dated 29 June 1917. *Foreign Relations of the United States – 1917 – The World War*. Page 1292.

²⁸ Reichsmarineamt to Aus Amt. Nr. A IV 10711. Dated 26 September 1917. Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nrs. 650, 2366. Dated 6, 7 October 1917. Reel #357/ Spanien 61/ 511, 516, 517.

²⁹ Ratibor to Aus Amt. Nrs. 653, 657, 659. Dated 10, 11 October 1917; and Kalle to Admiralstaff. Nr.

3646. Dated 12 October 1917. Reel #357/ Spanien 61/ 521, 519, 523, 559.

³⁰ Admiralstaff to Aus Amt., Ratibor, Vienna. Nr A 34705. Dated 18 October 1917. Aus Amt. to OHL. Nr. A 35187. Dated 18, 21 October 1917. Reel#357/ Spanien 61/ 563-566. Although espionage in Spain during World War I is generally overlooked or understated in books on spies, one author completely failed to give Kalle proper credit as head of the Abwehr intelligence bureau in Madrid. Ronald Seth, *Encyclopedia of Espionage*, Garden City, 1972. Marthe Richer, *I Spied for France*, London, 1935. She also claimed that the head of Intelligence was Naval-attaché von Krohn (whom she claims to have had a tryst with in order to discover incriminating documents).

³¹ Patrick Beesley, *Room 40 British Naval Intelligence 1914-1918*. London, 1982. pages 202-203, 245.

³² For a sampling of Arnold’s intrigues, see: General Staff to Aus Amt. Nrs. Pol 7761, 8311. Dated 29 May, 30 June 1916. Kalle to Aus Amt. Nr. 647. Dated 22 July 1916. Lucius (Stockholm) to Aus Amt. Nr. 1058. Dated 16 September 1916. Reel 402/ Weltkrieg 11q/ 378, 393, 402, 424.

³³ Lucius to Aus Amt. Nr. 1338. Dated 21 August 1917; Kalle to Aus Amt. Nrs. 608, 649. Dated 22 August, 3 October 1917. Reel #402/ Weltkrieg 11q/ 549, 551, 555. This was especially crucial due to the capture of another prominent German espionage agent, “Jakob”, in January 1917. Kalle to Aus Amt. Nrs. 78, 82. Dated 26, 28 January 1917. Reel #402/ Weltkrieg 11q/ 458, 459.