WHEN, IF EVER, CAN WE EXPECT GOVERMENTAL PLANNING TO WORK: ON PREMATURE PROGRAMMING OF PLANNING

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1. The premature quest for planning

In a recent and, for our purposes, quite pertinent paper *Martin Landau* et. al. have started out by saying: "If a domain of tasks can be mapped to a formal logic, and if that logic ordans the behavior of a large complex organization, then that organization becomes a decision machine whose operations are entirely unambiguous and whose output occasions no surprise."[1] I shall take it that within this compact sentence is contained the utopian goal of those social engineers who but too willingly have pressed for alterations in governmental decision-making in order to map public affairs with a logic of rationality.

Since the first decades of this century the traditional emphasis in governmental decision-making has been on the specification of the resources given to public agencies.[2] Distinctions have been made between a number of input-factors and control and auditing has been developed in terms of the use of these factors. Within the realm of the budgetary system this traditional emphasis has made it possible to counter corruption by specifying what resources are given to what agency for what use. But, knowing that a new official is going to be hired and that he really was hired, does, however, tell us little about what is actually achieved by the allocated resources.

In order to know what goods are produced we must allocate the cost and the resources to some group of activities with identifiable purposes. Thus the budgetary appropriations must be made in terms of programs intended to result in certain performances. With such a functional approach to the budgeting we can move toward knowing what performances are funded with what money.

Given our rationalistic concerns, we are not satisfied by expressing costs for government performances. We want to know what specific products or goods are

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[1] See *Martin Landau & Russel Stout & Jonathan Bendor*, To Manage Is Not To Control: Or the Folly of Type II Errors, paper to be published in *Public Administration Review*, 1979.

[2] This part of the article draws heavily from a short and pointed summary of the development by *Bertram M. Gross*, The New Systems Budgeting, *Public Administration Review*, nr 2, 1969, pp. 113-37. For a comparable review of the developments in Finland, see *Krister Stahlbert*, Planering, Planeringstankande och Reformstrategi Inon Statsforvaltningen (Planning, Planning Ideologies and Strategies of Reform within the Public Administration) in a book by the author, *Politik och Planering* (Politics and Planning), Abo, Publications of the Research Institute of the Abo Akademy Foundation, nr 20. 1978, pp. 115-77.

produced by the performances of the government. Thus we want to classify the products and to relate these categories of products or outputs to the costs of the production. With unambiguous definitions of products we can calculate the cost per unit of production, thus having grounds for shifting badly used money for more effective performances.

At this stage we know about the costs of input factors that are grouped in perfomance packages intended to produce identifiable units of output. Our next concern then is with the objectives of producing specific units of output. Why would we want to make a certain number of arrests or to move a certain number of people from a place to another? We are interested in the goals of specific programs, i. e. in the outcomes that we want to be brought about by the outputs. The concern is with establishing clear categories of concerns in our common endeavours.

The categories of concerns, our goals or objectives, are many. We want to reach many goals simultaneously. Such a want directs our attention the multitude of relations between goals and between goals and programs or performance packages. We want to make choices between alternative combinations of performance packages in order to meet as many concerns as possible.

Since we want to relate alternative performance packages to our overriding concerns, we want to express as precisely as possible what we are relating the performances to. Thus we strive to find indicators of those future worlds that we want to bring about by choosing among alternative performances.

As rationalists we are starting to feel increasingly comfortable. Not only do we know what we want to bring about, we also know that there are different sets of activities resulting in different amounts of output that are associated with different costs for input factors. The only crux of the matter is that we do not really know whether our output brings the intended outcomes about. Thus we recognize the need for careful analyses of the relationships between outputs and outcomes. We have finally come around to realize that in order to be rational we ought to know what we are doing.

It seems to me that this simplified and somewhat provocative account of the steps leading from cost awareness to performance budgeting, to planning programming budgeting systems, to social indicators and to policy analysis, does sum up much of the motivating thrust of the rationalistic movement.[3] It does also point to the fact that only recently have there evolved a full awareness of the cruciality to avoid what Landau et. al. call the folly of committing type II errors, e. e. to accept as true a hypotheses that is in fact false.[4]

A type II error is committed by launching full scale governmental policies that are not empirically warranted. In these cases bureaucracies are set up and interests are

[3] A view that is on the whole consistent with one we are expressing in this article on the development of management. information systems can be found in *Aaron Wildavsky*, Policy Analysis is What Information Systems Are Not, *New York Magazine*, spring 1977. The relationship between the development as here described in a general way and the management information system fads can be aquired by looking at the summarizing symposia held around these systems, A Symposium: Planning-Programming-Budgeting System Reexamined: Development, Analysis, and Criticism, *Public Administration Review*, nr 2, 1969, pp. 111-202, A Symposium, Management by Objectives in the Public Sector, *Public Administration Review*, nr 1, 1976, pp. 1-45, Forum, (on zero-base budgeting), *The Bureaucrat*, nr. 1, 1977, pp. 3-87, A symposium, Policy Analysis in Government: Alternatives to "Muddling Through", *Public Administration Review*, nr 3, 1977, pp. 221-63.

[4] Landau & al., op cit.

vested in a way that may lead to an aggravation rather than solution of the problem. This type of institutionalization of programs we call *premature programming*.[5]

My purpose here is to shift the focus somewhat and to look upon the introduction of governmental planning systems as cases of premature programming. Thus I want to give reasons for interpreting the planning debate within mixed economies as pointing to disappointments in premature programming of planning. I also want to indicate some consequences of this type of programming even if a fuller empirical demonstration must await the publication of a book that I am working on.

2. A further thread in the definitional web of planning

It is commonplace to note that planning has been defined in almost as many ways as there has been writers on the subject. Since I have felt that planning has been defined either in too general or too specific terms, I feel compelled not to make an exception to the habit of starting out with a definitional excursus.

In a general definition planning has been equated with attemps to control the consequences of our actions.[6] Such a definition indeed seems to imply that planning being everything perhaps is nothing. The formulation to me could as well be offered as a definition of decision-making in general. As we make decisions we choose among alternative courses of action in order to bring some intended consequenses about. A formulation of this kind disregards the fact that introduction of planning usually means institutionalizing new decision-making procedures. The definition also, of course, causes practical problems. How are we to determine when some decision-makers *attempt* to control the consequences of their actions.?

Planning also has been defined in too specific terms as when it is defined as the process by which a decision-maker selects a course of action (a set of means) for the attainment of his ends.[7] The planning is good if these means are likely to attain the ends or maximize the chances of their attainment. Formulations of this kind, it seems to me, equates planning with rational behavior in a traditional formal sense. We are to distinguish ends and means and to relate these to each other in order to find the best or at least a feasible solution. I find this to be too specific a formulation because it tends to allow only for formal rational planning. As I shall try to show, this is but one type of planning.

In order to pursue a middle-of-the-road argument I shall first try to distinguish planning as a specific kind of decision-making process and then try to distinguish between different types of planning.

In order to define planning as a type of decision-making process I shall make use of two definitional dimensions. Firstly, planning often is said to deal with not over or a

[5] op. cit.

[6] See *Aaron Wildavsky*, If Planning is Everything, Maybe it's Nothing, *Policy Schiences*, nr 4, 1973, pp. 127-53, also in *Naomi Caiden & Aaron Wildavsky*, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1974. An exchange of opinions on this way of defining planning occurred in *Aaron Wildavsky*, Why Planning Fails in Nepal, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, nr 4, 1972, pp. 508-28, *Kenji Okuda*, Comments on Wildavsky's "Why Planning Fails in Nepal", and Wildavsky's replay, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, nr 4, 1973, pp. 544-52.

[7] See *Edward C. Banfield*, Ends and Means in Planning, in *Faludi*, (ed.), A Reader in Planning Theory, Oxford, 1973, p. 139. A definition to the same effect has been given by *Herbert Simon & Victor Thompson & Donald Smithburg*, Public Administration, New York, 1950, p. 423. In *Stahlberg*, op. cit., pp. 17-22 I have discussed different definitions of planning in more detail.

few but with many decisions. Thus planning processes seem to be decision-making processes within which many decisions are deliberated upon simultaneously. Secondly, planning seldom seems to be equated with short run ad hoc decision-making. On the contrary, planning is usually related to an orientation toward the future. Thus planning processes seem to be decision-making processes within which the future consequences of the intended decisions are deliberated upon.

Using both of the distinctions made, we get the following simple typology of decision-making processes:

The number of decisions that are prepared within the decision-making process:	The decision-making process is directed toward:	
	short-term consequences	long-term consequences
one or few	Administrative decision processes	Investment decision processes
many	Budgetary processes	PLANNING

As I have done it elsewhere I shall not here comment on the four types of decision-making processes.[8] Suffice it to say that planning within the typology is distinguished from other types of decision-making and that with planning I shall understand a *decision-making process within which many decisions are prepared simultaneously with an orientation toward the long-term consequences of the intended decisions.*

This definition is only intended to delimit planning from other decision-making processes. Thus it does not distinguish between different ways we can go about planning. We therefore need to break down the general category of planning into more specific process categories. I shall attempt such a break down by offering an additional simple typology.

Firstly, planning can be categorized according to the degree of formalization of planning. A formalized planning refers to processes that are programmed in detail. Such programming denotes who should do what, when and in what way. The type of data to be compiled and the logic to be used in making calculations based on the data are given a priori. Adhering to simplicity I shall distinguish between strong and weak formalization of planning.

Secondly, I want to categorize planning according to a subjective or attitudinal factor. It seems to me that planners - or perhaps the planning agencies - can be divided into planners who percieve themselves and the agency to be relatively independent of its surrounding and planners who percieve themselves and the agency to be relatively dependent on the surrounding. The former planners act as if they had a high command over decision-making priorities and the mobilization of resources. The latter ones, of course, do not percieve themselves to have such a freedom.

Here I prefer to make this distinction in subjective terms since I assume that the orientation among planners will manifest itself in the way they go about planning.

Also it seems clear that the perceptions of the planners do not necessarily have to concur with the actual circumstances of the planners or the agency. But under cases of nonconcurrence I assume that the views of the planners will significantly influence the way the go about planning, i. e., the type of planning they attempt to institutionalize. This, of course, is not to say that such attempts will be successful.

Using the two distinctions I have made, we get the following typology of planning:

The degree of formalization of the planning process is:

The dependency of the planning organization on its surrounding is percieved to be:

	high	low
strong	Adaptive planning	Technical planning
weak	Corporativistic planning	Political planning

There would, of course, be ample cause to elaborate on the four types of planning in details.[9] Here I shall however regard them ideal types of planning. Thus I assume that each type of planning will, when institutionalized in concrete organizations, tend to show some characteristic features. Perhaps all features will not occur simultaneously in all situations, but enumerating these features will make it possible to grasp the nature of the types of planning. If we consider the intentional aspect of planning we can regard the set of features attached to each type of planning as a guideline for those institutionalizing planning systems.

The characteristic features of the four types of planning can be listed according to a number of aspects of decision-making processes. In choosing the aspects according to which the features are enumerated I have taken account of aspects that have been frequently mentioned in the decision-making literature focussing on the controversy between rationalists and incrementalists.[10]

I shall take it that the enumeration of features of the four types of planning speaks for itself. Instead I shall try to end this definitional excursus by indicating the resemblance of the four types of planning to some other decision-making or planning typologies.

It is evident from the enumerated features that technical planning for practical purposes can be equated with rationalistic decision-making. Technical planning ideals are what most attempts to improve governmental decision-making have been geared to. I tried to indicate the plausibility of such an interpretation in the first section of the article.

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[9] The four types of planning have been discussed in more detail in *Stahlberg*, op. cit. I have later found out that the typology seems to be closely related to an influential typology of decision-making, see *James D. Thompson* & *Arthur Tuden*, Strategies, Structures and Processes of Organizational Decision, in *James D. Thompson* et al. (eds.), *Comparative Studies in Administration*, University of Pittsburg Press, 1959, pp. 195-215. Also see *Martin Landau*, The Concept of Decision, in *James B. Christopher* & *Bernard E. Brown*, (eds.), *Cases in Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed., Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1976.

[10] Some important comments in this controversy are, *David Braybrook* & *Charles E. Lindblom*, *A Strategy of Decision:* Policy Evaluation as a Social Proces, The Free Press, New York, 1963 and *Charles E. Lindblom*, The Science of Muddling Through, *Public Administration Review*, nr 1, 1959, pp. 79-88. See also *Amitai Etzioni*, *The Active Society*, Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 254-68, and *Yehezkel Dror*, Muddling Through-Science or Inertia, *Public Administration Review*, nr 2, 1964, pp. 153-57.

Characteristics of the four types of planning:

Aspects:	Adaptive	Technical	Corporativistic	Political
1. Division of planning into stages	Detailed division, starts by looking at trends outside the organization	Detailed division, starts by setting goals for the the future	Unclear division, starts by noting the views of participants in planning	Unclear division, starts by analysis of problem-areas
2. Setting of goals	Weak goalsetting, goals in relation to trends outside the organization	Developed goalsetting, means-end hierarchies	No real goalsetting, goals are chosen in connection to means	No real goalsetting, goals are chosen in relation to problems
3. Nature of decision-making	Comprehensive decision-making in relation to trends outside the organization	Continuous planning, decisions are rarely made regardless of comprehensive plans	Decisions are made stepwise as agreement is reached-partiality	Decisions are made periodically based on negotiation around projects - neither partial or comprehensive
4. Parties with interests in decisions	Parties within the organization	Elected representatives are seen as goalinterested, specialists have meansinterests	All parties with interests from out-the organization	Cooperation with parties outside and inside the organization
5. The position of planning unit within the organization	Staff with experts	Staff with experts	Independent committee organization	Project organization with mixed manning
6. Information production	Trendinformation	Large formalized information systems analysis of information	Parties to decision-making have their own information	Parties have information information is separately gathered within projects
7. Search for alternatives	New measures as trends are worrying	Many alternatives are sought and heavily analysed, cost-benefit comparisons	Restricted analyses of alternatives according to agreements among parties	Alternatives analysed within projects, when agreement exists formal methods can be used
8. Criteria of decision-making	Accordance of means with outside trends, adaptive criteria	Optimizing goal-attainment, technical criteria	Agreement among parties who have veto-power-corporative criteria	Agreement in negotiations about the results of projects, political criteria

The political planning approach does bear much resemblance to incrementalistic decision-making. By talking about political planning I want, however, to indicate that I do not find the stress laid upon the smallness of changes, i. e. on the increments of change, to be the essential element of political planning. Instead it derives its characteristic features from the pluralistic nature of decision-making and from the avoidance of comprehensiveness. But new projects deliberated upon within the limits put by new money and by reallocated old money can, however, be sizable. The emphasis laid on projects and trade-offs between projects in the final compilation of the plan relates political planning to a pluralistic policy analytical tradition.[11]

Planning has been divided into *distributive, innovative* and *adaptive* planning.[12] From this division I have taken name of adaptive planning. But it can also be pointed out that technical and corporativistic planning can be seen to have distributive implications. In contrast political planning is related to innovative planning.

Finally, a somewhat different approach to planning makes a distinction between *product oriented* and *process oriented* planning.[13] Within this division technical and adaptive planning seems to be product oriented whereas political and corporativistic planning are predominantly process oriented. This does not mean, of course, that political plans cannot be presented as formal documents. Rather the correlations I have indicated stand for central tendencies of the types of planning.[14] The low formalization of political and corporativistic planning indicates their process orientation.

These additional comments on the resemblance between the four types of planning and other categorizations of planning have not been made only as a matter of curiosity. Rather I have indicated associations that will be drawn upon later.

3. Even if planning becomes increasingly inevitable...

As was pointed out earlier the type of planning that occurs within an agency can be seen as a function of the views held within the agency. I shall, however, assume that the occurrence of planning is not only a function of *intentional* factors but of *causal* factors as well. Here I shall dwell upon the causal factors in order later to discuss the intentional or finalistic dimension.

It seems to me, although I know of no empirical evidence bearing on the question, that planning as I have defined it has become increasingly more frequent through history, Assuming that the impression is correct, we may inquire as to why this would be so. In order to understand why planning has become more frequent we must look to broad historial circumstances. I would like to suggest that there are at least two general structural properties of societies - or perhaps of organizations as well - that can be

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[11] For a comparison see references in note 10. Also *Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting*; A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes, Little Brown, Boston, 1975.

[12] *John Friedman*, A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning Behavior, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, nr 2, 1967, pp. 223-52. I have here used the word distributive planning or the term allocative planning that is used by Friedman.

[13] This distinction is made by *Tore Hansen* & *Frida Nokken*, Kommunene og Generalplanleggingen, Department of Political Science, Oslo Unviersity, 1975 (mimeographed report).

[14] The relationship between the four types of planning and other typologies has been more extensively dealt with in *Krister Stahlberg*, Partier, Forvaltning och Planering: En Tolkningsskiss, *Yhteiskuntasuunnittelu*, nr 3, 1978, pp. 2-8 (Political Parties, Administration and Planning).

linked to the evolution of planning. The first property is the classical macrovariable, the division of work in a society.[15] The second property is likewise a structural variable, namely the number of autonomous decision-makers or perhaps, decision centers.

Utilizing these variables the following table of hypotheses can be advanced:

The degree of division   The number of autonomous decision-makers:
of work:

	many	few
low	Few decisions simultaneously; short-term orientation. Administrative or investment decisions.	
high	Many decisions; shorterm orientation. Budgetary decisions.	Many decisions; longterm orientation. Planning.

It is only as a matter of theoretical convenience that I am presenting the table with simple dichotomized variables. In the real world the variables are continuous. This simplified form of presentation serves, however, the purpose of indicating important assumed tendencies. Moving from a low to a high degree of division of work within a society increases the interdependence of varying activities. The increased interdependence can be assumed to further coordinative decision-making approaches. In this context it is assumed to cause an increasing number of decisions to be deliberated upon simultaneously.

If a highly specialized society has a large number of autonomous decision-makers, we can safely assume that the decisions made by each of them are not very large, Hence none of these decision-makers can hurt each other seriously and there is no need to take account of the long term consequences of all decisions. We would say that decision making is fragmented and reactive. Most of the coordination can be taken care of by the "invisible hand".

As the number of decision-makers in an autonomous position decreases we get fewer but larger decision-makers. Still these decision-makers are dependent upon each other. As larger decision-makers are dependent upon each other we can assume that they not only have to consider what the others are doing, they also have to do it in a long-term perspective. The upsets that could be possible press the decision-makers into a cooperative relationship. Under these conditions planning will arise.

Historically we have moved toward a greater division of work and in most western countries we also have had a development toward fewer autonomous decision-makers-in this respect we could look at the growth of labor unions, of business unions, of large corporations, at the growth in executive power within the public sector etc. These developments thus make for increased use of planning as a way of deriving at decisions. Planning becomes increasingly inevitable.

[15] This variable and its use in sociological macro-theory has been extensively discussed by *Erik Allårdt*, Samhallsstruktur och sociala spanningar, WSOY, Tampere, 1965 (Social Structure and social tension). For a general and short presentation of the line of theorizing that I am attempting here see *Amitai Etzioni*, Toward a Macrosociology, in *James S. Coleman & Amitai Etzioni & John Porter, Macrosociology*: Research and Theory, Allyn & Bacon Inc., Boston, 1970, pp. 107-43.

4...   it must not necessarily be guised in formal rational garments

Even if planning in the previous broad historical perspective seems to grow increasingly inevitable, this does not tell us what type of planning that tends to arise. Continding the type of reasoning we have pursued here, we must turn to other explanatory variables in order to understand what type of planning will arise.

My search for explanatory variables again leads me to consider two structural variables. The first variable is the degree of centralization within the planning system. The second variable is the amount of external pressure that is brought to bear upon the planning system. As can immediately be seen, both variables are somewhat problematical for empirical purposes. In both cases we can find a number of definitions of the crucial terms and a number of corresponding operationalizations. Nevertheless I feel that the concepts are usable for the rather rought theorizing that we are engaged in here.

Using the two variables we can derive at the following table of hypotheses:

The degree of centralization within the planning system:

Amount of external pressure:

	high	low
high	Corporativistic planning	Technical planning
low	Adaptive planning	Political planning

The two explanatory variables are assumed to influence the criterias according to which we defined the four types of planning. If the external pressure is low, i. e if for instance few pressure groups are interested in the activities of the planning organization or the planning system, we assume that it will be likely that the planners proceed as if they could act relatively independently. If at the same time the planning system is highly centralized it mean that there is a distance formal procedures must be devised. Hence we expect technical planning to result.

If, on the other hand, external pressure is high, i. e there are strong groups exerting influence on the planning organization, and if the organization is centralized, e. e the planners themselves are in a strong position, we expect corporativistic planning to occurs. In this case, contrary to what might be expected, planning is not very formalized. Because of the strong position of the planners and the strong external pressure, planners have to work together with the outside pressure groups in order to get support for their intentions. In fact we can expect the pressure groups to have their support for their intentions. In fact we can expect the pressure groups to have their own representatives within the planning system, thus making it their forum for bargaining.

As the external pressure is low, as it is exerted by weak or by very fragmented interests, and as the planning system is decentralized, e. e consisting of many actors who can independently try to influence the planning, we expect political planning to occur. The frequent interaction between competing actors makes it impossible to program the decision-making in detail. At the same time, however, it is possible for the planners to plan under the assumption that what comes out of the planning process can indeed be implemented.

Adaptive planning is perhaps most difficult to fit into our table of hypotheses. Taking the view that the total planning system consists of many rather independent actors who have but limited resources to influence their surrounding, we may nevertheless insert adaptive planning into the fourth cell. For instance many smaller private corporations have to plan this way even if they are part of a more general economic planning system. Since these organizations are under constant external pressure, we expect them to utilize routinized procedures to adapt to the external changes having bearing on their activities.

We have now in parts three and four tried to trace some causal factors influencing the occurrence of planning in general and of specific types of planning in particular. But it was also maintained that the types of planning that are strived for do not only occur under the influence of the causal factors. Planning systems are not imposed on us by some superhuman, they are envisaged and institutionalized by actors within the society or within an organization. We thus expect the intentions of these actors to influence the evolvement of a specific type of planning also. We shall therefore turn to an examination of these intentional or finalistic grounds for understanding the evolution of planning.

5.   Why do we attempt one type of planning rather than another

Turning now to the finalistic side of the argument, we have to make two assumptions and one limitation. The first assumption is that the four types of planning can be seen as distinct planning ideologies. In other words; I percieve the table on the features of the four types of planning to provide distinct and coherent views on how planning could be conducted. I do not necessarily imply that there is a one to one correspondence, but I do assume that the basic features of the planning types are part of those planning ideologies that potential planners have.

The second assumption is that it is not indifferent what type of planning we engage in. Thus I expect the type of planning we are engaged in to have consequences for those who are engaged in the planning.[16] These consequences can pertain directly to the material output of the planning exercise, to the power-position of those engaged in the planning, to the values of the planners, or to some other aspect of importance to those who engage in the planning venture.

The limitation we must call attention to is that I shall mainly keep the public sector in mind as I continue the argument. Perhaps it is also important to note that my conceptions have envolved through studying planning in a European multi-party context. Therefore I cannot as yet be sure about the value of the argument for another type of context.[17]

[16] This assumtion has formed an important contention in the critique of planning oriented attempts to reform the budgetary process, see *Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process,* Little Brown, Boston, 1974 (sec. ed.), chapters 4 and 5.

[17] Two articles that indicate a rather striking similarity between the American debate on planning and the tredition in Europa multi-party systems are, *Peter H. Schuck,* National Economic Planning: A Slogan Without Substance, *Public Interest,* fall 1976, pp. 63-78, and *Murray Weidenbaum & Linda Rockwood,* Corporate Planning versus Governmental Planning, *Public Interest,* Winter 1977, pp. 59-72. In these articles governmental planning is treated as technical planning int his article and corporate planning is very similar to what I have called adaptive planning. I do not however share the opinion that large corporartions are necessarily engaged in adaptive planning.

When we now turn to the reasons for actors to strive for one type of planning rather than another, we must first ask what actors there are that influence the type of planning that is chosen. In order to keep my reasoning simple I shall here note two type of actors, political parties and governmental agencies. There are, of course, other actors that are important, but for the present purposes I think that these two groups can be chosen in order to illustrate my theoretical reasoning. Also in many multiparty systems the groups are perhaps the most important actors.[18]

We can now ask why political parties would be expected to favor óne type of planning to another. It seem to me that we could use two rough variables to predict what type of planning the political parties can be expected to favor. Again one variable is a structural one. If a political party acts in order to achieve some goals, I would expect the structural position of that party to influence its mode of behavior. Thus we can use the power position of the party as a structural variable, roughly distinguishing between parties in power and parties out of power. In operational terms this division could be one of having cabinet seats or not having any. It could also be seen as a variable pertaining directly to the number of parliamentary seats of the party. We could also weight the cabinet and parliamentary power of the party with its capacity for coalition formation with other parties. But it is not my intention to dwell upon problems of operationalization. Suffice it to say that I expect those aspects of the parties that were mentioned to influence the attitude of the parties to types of planning.

The other variable I want to use in order to understand the behavior of political parties pertains to their orientation. It seems reasonable to assume that the four types of planning are not equally useful for political purposes. Thus I would expect the parties to hold different views on planning depending on whether they want to change or to preserve present circumstances. In this context the orientation toward change is a question about the amount of major reforms advocated by a party. From this formulation it should be clear that one party may favor different types of planning for different areas of concern for the party. Thus a problematical situation is that in which comprehensive modes of planning are institutionalized. In these situation some composed indicator of the orientation of the party has to be made. Here I shall, however, only make note of this problem.

The two variables can be utilized to derive one additional fourfold table of hypotheses on the orientation of political parties toward different types of planning:

The political parties are: The political parties are:

	status quo oriented	change oriented
in power	Technical planning	Political or corporativistic planning
in opposition	Adaptive planning	Political planning

[18] It should be pointed out, however, that especially labor and business unins arè organization that sould also be taken into account. The more powerful these unions are and the more the subject area of planning is one in which the unions wish for changes, the more they will favor corporative planning. In areas where they are not interested in changes but in a stable continuation of the services, they can be expected to opt for technical planning.

Political parties that are in a position of power and that are status quo oriented, can be expected to favor technical planning. This type of planning, as we have seen, is distributive and product oriented. The planning process is formalized and the plan is a prepared document providing for the distribution of resources among established programs. For parties in power an adherence to such formalized procedures and to formally adopted documents is an advantage, since their position enables them to use whatever mobilization of bias has been built into the planning process. Within this type of system outside initiatives can be buried in the bureaucracy or they can be killed with reference to bewildering administrative arguments.

If the political parties in power are oriented toward drastic changes they tend to prefer either political or corporativistic planning. Political planning is innovative and it is process oriented. Within this type of planning you can accommodate whatever bargaining processes are called for and the planning process is suited to the needs of working on projects. New programs can but rarely be worked out without surprises demanding such adjustments as would be difficult to manage within a more rigid technical process. The economy of analysis that is attainable in political planning also makes it more expedient than technical planning.

However, even if a party is in power, there can be areas of concern within mixed economies within which the parties have but limited power. For instance projects within the twilight area between the public and the private sector are difficult to manage without turning to corporativistic planning. Political parties soon learn that they are faced with difficult if not unsurmountable problems of implementation if they disregard the veto power of influential groups. A successful commitment to change thus precludes bargaining with such veto groups. Also in other respects corporativistic planning shares the advantages of political planning over technical planning.

It seems that adaptive planning is opted for by weak parties having slight or no interest in drastic changes. Adaptive planning is product oriented and thus contains the same type of conserving elements as technical planning. And, of course, the whole idea of adaption growns from the assumption that existing social forces may continue to operate.

Finally, if a political party is weak and if it wishes for major changes to occur, we would expect such a party to favor political planning. Innovative as this type of planning is, it is suited to the purposes of change oriented parties. But it also presents some hope for weak parties to share in the innovative work since political planning is not strictly formal and regulated, which would make it almost impossible for a weak group to penetrate the planning.

This has been an attempt to understand why political parties prefer one type of planning to another. But it was also said that the institutionalization of planning is not only dependent on political actors but on administrative actors as well. At least within a European context where bureaucracies traditionally have occupied a consequential position, I would not expect planning to be instituted without regard to bureaucratic preferences. Hence we would like to understand not only why political parties but why bureaucracies as well perefer one type of planning to another.

Here I shall suggest that such an understanding can be reached simply by an analogous reasoning to the argument we advanced for political parties. Governmental agencies or bureaucracies thus can be divided according to their importance. This importance can, for instance, be inferred from the amount of money that is channelled

via the agency, from the number of officials working within the agency or from some other measure of prominence. The bureaucracies also can be divided into status quo or change oriented organizations depending on the type of changes they are advocating or initiating. With these distinctions we are able to formulate hypotheses about agencies similar to those about political parties. Reform and growth oriented bureaucracies with large resources can be expected to favor political or corporativistic planning, whereas large conservative bureaucracies can be expected to opt for technical planning. Stabilizing weak bureaucracies can be expected to prefer adaptive planning while their change oriented counterparts favor political planning.

We have now considered two types of actors, political parties and governmental agencies, and we have assumed that these actors operate independently of eachother. In the real world, of course, the actors are competing or cooperative. According to the hypotheses we have advanced so far they may either seek the same type of planning or they may have diverging interests. In this context it would be presumtious to elaborate in detail on the expected outcomes from simultaneously considering parties and agencies. Let me however, in a summary fashion point out the expected outcomes of such a consideration.[19] This can be done in the form of a matrix.

Type of agency:	Type of political party:			
	strong/ status quo	weak/ change	weak/ status quo	weak/ change
strong/ status quo	Technical planning	Political/ corporativistic planning	Technical planning	Technical planning
strong/ change	Political planning	Political corporativistic planning	Political corporativistic planning	Political corporativistic planning
weak/ status quo	Technical planning	Political corporativistic planning	Adaptive planning	Depends on position of strongs
weak/ change	Political planning	Political corporativistic planning	Depends on position of strongs	Political planning

6. To search for premature programming of planning

Thus far we have tried to argue that there exists different types of decision-making and that one type, planning, can be further divided into types. Planning tends to become more frequent, but the type of planning that will occur is dependent on the intentions of those who institute planning and on the type of situation in which planning occurs. Thus we have distinguished between causal and finalistic grounds for undertanding what type of planning that evolves.

[19] The reasoning that lies behind the hypotheses included in the matrix have been dealt with in the above article by me, Partier..., op. cit.

The two sets of factors influencing the evolvement of planning need not coincide. It seems entirely compatible with what we have said so far that at any particular moment there may exist political parties and governmental agencies struggling to institute political planning in a situation that can be characterized as involving high external pressure and a high degree of centralization. In such a situation we expect the causal factors to work for a corporativistic type of planning. There may, of course, exist any other situation in which the causal and intentional factors pull in different directions. Such situations involve attempts to program planning prematurely; the institutionalization of a procedure that is incompatible with the forces pulling the situation is believing in consequences that will not be brought about. Perhaps, as it has been suggested, planning under such circumstances becomes part of the problem it was intended to solve.

In order to search for and in order systematically to analyze premature programming of planning we can contrast causal and intentional factors within a matrix:[20]

The societal conditions favor:

The political parties and the governmental agencies want:

	Adaptive planning	Technical planning	Corporativistic planning	Political planning
Adaptive planning	XXX	(I B)		
Technical planning		XXX		
Corporativistic planning			XXX (IV)	
Political planning		(I A, II, III)		XXX (V)

Within the matrix the diagonal indicates cases of balance between causal and intentional factors affecting planning. In these instances we would expect planning to work well, or rather, to work as well as it is possible for it to work. I shall later shortly return to this additional qualification on the possibilities of planning that I think we

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[20] It sould be pointed out that I see the causal factors as mores dominating than the intentional factors. However, in short run there need not be a concurrence of these factors. Especially under periods of institutionalization of planning, we can expect to find many instances of imbalance between intentional and causal factors. I should also here be said that I am not with these formulations adhering to firm notions of determinism. Rather I attempt in the vein of Etzioni to formulate the theory within a line of thinking that is compatible with the view of a guided society. From a voluntaristic aspect not only can actors try to institute planning that runs contrary to the causal factors. They can also attempt to change the causal factors thus bringing concurrence between intentions and causes about. From this perspective we can in fact formulate a number of strategies for alleviating the problems of premature programming. I have attemped to discuss such strategies in Balans och..., op. cit., and Politik och ..., op. cit.

must be aware of.[21] Anyway, within the cells along the diagonal we would expect the extent or degree of premature programming to be small or perhaps even nonexistent.

The other cells within the matrix do, of course, indicate instances of premature programming of planning. In order to illustrate my reasoning I have numbered some cells hereby indicating specific planning systems that can be classified into the cells within a Finnish context. I shall briefly comment on these numbered planning systems in order to indicate the way the matrix can be used.

In 1972 a new public health planning system was instituted by law in Finland.[22] At the central level this planning is classified into cell I A and on the local level it is classified into cell I B. At all levels this planning system is very formalized. There exist clear time-tables for the planning and most of it must be done on a priori formulated forms. The main groups of health services that must be included in the plan are enumerated in the law itself. As the planning process if to some extent synchoronized with the yearly budgetary cycle, every actor within the process must perform his part according to the script.

The planning system was supported by a coalition of political parties that have been in power almost all the time since 1966. The planning system helps in creating an automatic distribution of resources to public health services. Alongside the political parties the administrators within the Board of Health and the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health have strongly supported the institutionalization of the system. To these bureaucracies the planning system has offered a change to secure an advantage in the fight for funds, thus helping these bureaucracies to stabilize their surrounding. Thus on the intentional side there was a pressure in favor of a technical planning system which was also written into law.

On the causal side the situation looks somewhat different. At the national level it is perhaps true that outside pressures on the health services are not very strong, at least not in a comparative perspective. Nevertheless it would be wrong to hold the opposite opinion also. By and large, however, the external pressure could still be seen to fall into the weak half of our typology of the causal factors, even if during the last years there has been a slow build up in the external interest stemming from the labor and business unions.

In order to have a workable technical planning we also assumed that the planning system must be centralized. This condition does not seem to be satisfied by the planning

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[21] As we recall a fundamental argument within the incrementalist line of thought is that out intelligence is insufficient for those information and analysis tasks that are required in rational problem solving. In relation to this contention we can with *Herbert Simon* distinguish between programmed and nonprogrammed decisions. This distinction pertains to the programmability of the subject matter that we are deciding or planning on. Thus the division is possible also in the case of technical planning that is in balance. And we would for nonprogrammable decisions expect that they create planning problems even if the intentional and causal factors concur, see *Herbert Simon. The New Science of Management Decisions*, 3rd ed., Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, 1977, pp. 39-81.

[22] The comments on the public health planning system are drawn partly from my experiences in planning as a consultant and partly by a thorough inquiry into the decision making within this system by a student at the Department of Political Science at Abo Academy, *Inger Ahlback*, Planeringen for Folkhalsoarbetet: Teori och Praxis inom Folkhalsoplaneringen, Abo Academy, 1978 (mimeographed report). This work is part of a larger research project on planning that we are conducting.

system. Firstly, at the national level the Board of Health has to compete for funds with other agencies under the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health. This competition is followed by an even harder competition among the ministries, with the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health being only one among eleven ministries. And secondly, the planning system aims at coordinating and steering all public health services regardless of where they are provided. Thus also the local governmental system is woven into the planning process. And between the local and the central government lie the regional authorities that are also expected to share in the planning. Thus, even if this governmental sector has been centralized by the institutionalization of planning, if is nowhere near as centralized as it should be in order to satisfy the condition of centralization. We therefore must conclude that the causal factors work in favor of a political planning. This is true for the planning system in general and especially for the central governmental planning.

If we consider the planning system from the perspective of the local governments, we find ourselves in a somewhat different situation. The intentional factors still favor technical planning, but at the causal side we do not really have conditions favoring political planning anymore. The local governmental planning is far more regulated than the central level planning. Not only are there specific forms that are to be used in planning, there moreover exist yearly directives issued by the central authorities defining how the forms should be filled out. These directives in fact in most cases regulate the services to be provided in a minute detail, thus doing away with practically all local governmental discretion in providing health services. Thus the external pressure on the local governments is very high indeed and their internal decision-making is decentralized very much in the way that the central governmental decision-making was said to be. Therefore the conditions of planning at the local level tend to favor adaptive planning.

The public health planning now seems to be an instance of premature programming of planning both at the central and local levels of planning. We would thus expect this planning to show a number of unexpected and unsearched for consequences. In a last section of the article I shall turn to some such failures within this system of planning.

Since the latter part of the 60'ies there has been an expansion of the planning within local governmental units.[23] Today this type of planning - communal planning (from commun - the name of the local governmental units at the primary level) - is compulsory. Within the system the local governments are expected to plan their services, their land use and their economy for a five year period. There exists handbooks on this planning that in a detailed fashion spell out planning procedures that are very technical in the sense we have used the word here. This type of planning has been favored and recommended by the central associations of the communes and it has been readily acepted by the bureaucrats in local government. Somewhat more reluctantly the

    [23] The discussion around the communal planning is drawn from two studies within the planning project at Abo Academy, the licentiate thesis of *Goran Djupsund*, Planerings-aktivitet och Planform: Studie i Kommunplanernas Forekomst och Form, Communications from the Faculty of Social Sciences at Abo Academy, Serie B: 54, 1976 (Planning Activity and Types of Plans), and *Krister Stahlbert*, Teori och Praxis i Kommunal Planering, Publications of the Research Institute of the Abo Academy Foundation, nr 4, 1975 (dissertation on Theory and Praxis in Local Planning). Both reports use the same empirical material.

planning procedures have been acepted by the representatives. The intentional factors, however, on an average favor a quite technical planning ideal.

Again the causal situation is somewhat different. It is true that the local governmental units have considerable possibilities to influence the distribution of values within their units when we look at all values that can be distributed. At the same time, however, it is also true that this freedom on the local level is diminishing as a consequence of central governmental actions. However, at the present time there are still a number of aspects pertaining to the use of land and to the production of services that can indeed be influenced by the local government.

The internal decision-making process is by and large decentralized. There are pressure groups of various kinds and there is a number of local governmental committees mandated to futher special service interests. Thus the situation is very pluralistic with a number of groups being organized to defent special interests. Such conditions do not, of course, favor technical planning. On the contrary, the internal politics of local governments clearly favor political planning. Hence we have in this planning again an instance of prematurely programmed planning. since the planning is prematurely programmed we do not expect it to come out the way its proponents had hoped for.

As were both of the already mentioned planning systems, so the third one, the central governmental five year social and economic planning system, is of a technical kind both in respect to the form of the planning and the intentions of those involved.[24] And the intentions are understandable. The planning system is lead by the Ministry of Finance and it comprises in principle all activities that budgeted for within the state budget. Hence all sector ministries and boards under these have to submit a plan to the Ministry of Finance. Based on these submissions the ministry yearly attaches to the budgetproposal a five year outlook on the public finances. This five year outlook has some of the features of program budgeting in that the outlook is not prepared based on traditional administrative classifications but by grouping the expenditures according to groups of activities corresponding to the assumed general objectives or functions of the states.

By opting for this type of planning system the Ministry of Finance strengthes its position and it creates documents that it can use as administrative tools in fighting it out with sector ministries.[25] Likewise the political parties in power have, at least among the influential politicians, seen this type of planning as a device for strong leadership. The opinions of the politicians are, however, understandably divided. Many important

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[24] The discussion on the social and economic planning system draws upon an additional study within the mentioned planning project, *Guy-Erik Isaksson*, Plan och Utfall iKTS-planeringen, *Hallinto*, nr 8, 1978, pp. 11-20, and by the same author, Plan och Utfall i den Statliga Verksamhets-och ekonomiplaneringen: En Komparativ Analysis av Olika Plantypers Forhallande till Varandra Inom den Statliga Medellanga Planeringen, Department of Political Science at Abo Academy, 1978 (A Comparison Between Budgets and Plans in the Five-Year National Social and Economic Planning System). Further I have used some preliminary data produced by Guy-Erik Isaksson and soon to be published within the project.'

[25] I have commented upon the use of planning systems in the struggle for power between the Ministry of Finance and the Office of the Prime Minister in *Krister Stahlberg, Den Fajanga Stravan Efter Ratt Svar pa Fel Fraga, Kommunalvetenskaplig Tidskrift*, nr 2, 1978, pp. 46-59 (The Vain Pursuit for a Correct Answer on a Wrong Question: On the Development of the Central Planning in Finland).

politicians within the parties hold cabinet posts, thus being leaders of particular ministries. As representatives of their ministries they have to fight the Ministry of Finance in order to come out well in the competition around scarce resources, or rather, they have to fight eachother, but it is done in negotiations with the budget makers.

Due already to the reasons discussed above, the planning conditions are not as centralized as one should hope for as a proponent of technical planning. There indeed exists many possibilities to set independently policy objectives, but this setting of objectives is influenced by a pluralistic competition among actors within the planning system. Thus there exists the same type of conflict as for the earlier planning systems, and due to the magnitudes of the tasks within this system, the frustration of expectations can be expected to be notable.

Into the matrix I have also included two planning systems that can be interpreted as mirroring a balance between the causal and the intentional factors. The system IV stands for the planning system for economic policy at the central governmental level. Within this system no recurrent planning documents of a priori fixed kind are produced. Instead the planning is mainly conducted within governmental commissions. In these commissions we find representatives of the state, labor unions and business unions. Most of the commissions are created as a response to commonly felt problems and solutions are sought for that are possible for all parties to the planning to accept.

Power parties with interest in change have in these situations reconciled themselves with the fact that they cannot act against the interests of the other parties to the planning. Consequently we have seen very few attempts to create planning systems that are not tuned to this fact. This planning is centralized, but it has strong outside pressures to conform to. Thus, in terms of this analysis, the planning system is in balance and does not represent an instance of premature programming. Consequently I expect the planning system by and large to perform according to the expectations of those involved in the exercise. Perhaps I should also note in passing that this does not signify a normative acceptance on my part of such a balanced planning. On normative ground one may well hold that this type of planning is questionable in terms of the meager democratic influence on the planning by parliament.

The fifth and final type of planning that is included in the matrix refers to a number of project based planning systems that exist in many local governmental units. In these cases planning projects are created around questions of common concern to many groups within the local communities. Within the planning information bearing on the problem is analysed and bargaining around solutions takes place among the parties to the planning. Few established procedures exist and the planning documents vary to a considerable extent thus being adapted to the percieved needs of the problem.

The parties to the planning are mainly change oriented and they may be either in a position of power or in opposition. The planning system is decentralized accomodating many groups with independent bases of influence. The external pressure on the planning is usually rather small due to the fact that most of the external pressures are built into the planning venture. Most projects are futhermore created around problems that are possible to solve at least in some way within the limits of the local governmental mandate. Thus we have here an instance of planning that is in balance regarding the interests of those engaged in the process and regarding outside conditions

of planning. And whats more, the planning is organized very much in terms of what has here been labeled political planning.

7. The folly of technical intentions in a political world

Within the guidelines of the matrix we have indicated a number of instances of premature programming of planning. It was also said that premature programming can be expected to be characterized by a number of unexpected and unsearched for symptoms or, as I would prefer to call them, consequences. In order to discuss such consequences systematically we would need a set of criteria for assessing the planning ordeals. Then the theoretical argument advanced in the article could be extended with a number of propositions combining specific instances of premature programming with expected values on the assessment criteria.

Since our present purpose is limited only to showing some consequences of premature programming, it would take us too far here to attempt such a systematical assessment. Instead I shall close my argument by pointing out only a few consequences of a specific type of premature programming. We shall here examine some empirical findings that seem to have a bearing on the assessment of attempts to institutionalize technical planning under conditions favoring political planning.

Perhaps the attempts to institutionalize technical planning in a political world are the most frequent cases of premature programming of planning. We have already examined a number of such cases within a Finnish context, and the list could be made longer. But also the American debate on management information systems seems predominantly to be concerned with this very same type of premature programming of decision-making.[26]

Rather than trying to develop a systematic frame for assessing this type of premature programming, I shall examine three aspects of the planning. A cardinal feature of technical planning is the distinction between means and ends. It thus seems appropriate to look at how goals are set in the planning process. Also technical planning assumes that the planning process can be clearly divided into steps and that each step is related to another in a way that makes for a final rational decision. Therefore we shall examine some findings on how the attempts at technical planning succeed in relating the steps in the planning process to each other. Finally, in technical as in other types of planning it is assumed that the plan - whatever guise it may assume - has a steering effect on subsequent implementing decisions. Thus we can examine some findings showing the consistency between plans and implementation.

We shall start out by examining the formulation of goals. The technical view, as has been said, holds goals to be essential to any decision-making. The goals should be formulated so as to form a function in relation to which an optimal set of decisions can be chosen. Technical planning thus necessitates a clear set of goals. We might even say that these goals should be expressed at a middle-range level in order not to be too general or too specific. If goals are expressed in general terms they are unlikely to

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[26] For a very good case account of the attempt to institutionalize planning within the State Department - a technical intention in a political world -0 see *Frederick C. Mosher & John E. Carr, Programming Systems and Foreighn Affairs Leadership: An Attempted Innovation*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970. Also see *Allen Shick*, A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of Federal, PPB, *Public Administration Review*, nr. 2, 1972.

discriminate between possible decisions thus being void of that steering capacity which goals are assumed to have. If, on the other hand, goals are expressed in too specific terms, it is likely that they only serve the purpose of sanctioning activities that have already been decided upon.

Under political conditions for planning we would expect it to be difficult to set comprehensive and consistent goals and we sould expect the goals, insofar as they are set at all, to be changing. The conditions of political planning denote competing interests trying to secure some advantage that they have settled upon before they enter the planning process. Thus we would expect goals to be formulated either in general and noncommitting terms making it possible for divergent interests to be accomodated in the decision-making, or we would expect goals to be formulated very specifically pertaining to decisions that have already been made, either formally or informally. In no case would we expect the goals to be very consistent, nor would we expect them to be persistent. The persistency of the goals can be expected to be especially weak as soon as the goals are formulated in so specific terms that they have a clear guiding capacity. Under political conditions, the more steering power the goals have, the more they vacillate.

As was mentioned the communal planning is a technically guided system in a political world. Some years ago I inquired into the goals of somewhat less than 100 communal plans in Finland.[27] In one fourth of the plans no goals were mentioned at all. The plans only listed proposed decisions and the information on which these proposals were based. Slightly less than half of the communes had indeed bothered to set goals, but in a very nòncommitting form. In most cases the goals were expressed in the following way: the local authorities aim at providing all members of the communes an education, a health and a social welfare according to their needs. In other words: half of the communes expressed their goals only as declaratory phrases.

The remaining fourth of the communes did try to express their goals in somewhat more precise terms. The solution in most cases to the problem of finding more precise goals was to express general goals and to break these general goals down into a number of sectoral goals, that is goals pertaining to some specific set of activities carried out within specifically institutionalized structures. Can we then conclude that about one fourth of the communes did indeed succeed in setting goals in accordance with the technical view on planning? For a number of reasons such a conclusion is false.

The more precise formulation of goals had in most cases three typical properties. Firstly, the sectorgoals were formulated in almost as general terms as the general goals, i. e. it was said that the authorities aimed at providing as good social welfare services as possible. Secondly, even if more precise formulations than these were used, the formulation usually ended up with a rest category into which all such services that did not get a formulation of their own were included. According to the more precise formulations therefore a number of explicitly mentioned services were to be accorded special attention and so was a final rest category, the attention thus being directed toward all existing types of services as well as any new type that might arise during the period of the plan.

Thirdly, in a stepwise presentation of goals, that is as we are faced with a means ends hierarchy, we expect that the relationship between the lower and the higher level

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goals are presented. In the formulations we have discussed here no such arguments about the relationships between goals at different levels could be found. Thus we can conclude that the communal plans contain goals that seem to be typical of those we can expect in such a prematurely programmed where technical garments are drawn upon a political reality.

Basically the same type of conclusions can be drawn if we examine the national health planning system.[26] The five-year plans that are revised yearly have contained a fairly stable set of goals during the years 1972-78 (i. e. until the latest plan examined here 1978-82). There have existed seven goals altogether and four of these have been included in all plans. Only one of these seven goals has been deleted from later plans, the reason simply being that the goals was to end the initiation phase of the new planning system. Two new goals are included in the seven goals. Typically enough, of these two goals one aims at improving the content of health services and the efficiency of the service-methods (whatever this may mean) and the other aims at improving the effectiveness of the health services. We could hardly find more general goals for a national health services system.

We have said that the technical planning is product oriented and allocating. Thus we expect the plans to contain references that tie the future development of services to clear frames. If we thus look at the central plan as a formulation of goals for the local plans, we find such restricting goalformulations as might be expacted. The national plans contain a five-year program for development of the number of personnell within the health centers at the local level, the amount of central funds transferred to the local level, the number of hospital beds to be found in the health centers etc. But as we expected, the more concrete the goals are, the more they vacillate. For instance, in the first plans it was indicated that the number of new beds in local hospitals should increase with 300 the first two years and thereafter with 400 beds a year. In the plan adopted the next year these numbers had arisen to 400 beds the first year and 500 beds the next four years. Two years later the number of new beds was again lowered to 400 beds a year for two years whereafter 500 beds a year could again be reached.

An even larger variation than the one indicated above can be found for the amount of funds to be allocated by the national government to the local governments for building these hospitals. From these figures we may infer that building new hospitals becomes cheaper year after year despite the rolling inflation (sic.). The situation regarding the number of new personnel at the health centers is even more alarming. In the plan for the years 1977-81 the number of new doctors for the year 1978 was set at 250, the number of dentists at 80 and the number of odd personnel at 560 - just to mentioned a few of the personnel categories in the plan. The next year, in the plan for 1978-82, the comparable figures for 1978 were 30, 0 and 170. Still the year before local plans had been confirmed containing more than twice that number of persons. Without going futher into these changes in the goals we can conclude that the alterations have been large indeed, and that they are common in situation where the goals have been expressed in concrete terms. Technical planning seems to be ill suited to cope with the uncertainty of the surrounding it is assumed to control. This uncertainty is partly of a political nature and partly due to the difficulties in foreseeing even drastic changes outside the planning organization.

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[28] See note 22.

The second aspect according to which we were to examine the planning pertained to the institutionalization of the planning process. If technical planning is to work it must be institutionalized according to a formally foxed procedure for the planning. The process is divided into parts that are programmed before the planning starts. Not only must this process be programmed, it also contains steps that are supposed to be related to eachother in a certain way which is best approximated by the traditional notions of the analytical steps in a rational problem solving. A prerequisite for succeeding in relating the steps to eachother in an ideal way is that those who are parties to the decision-making agree to see each step as an obligating part of an accepted super-process. In other words: If the goals are to be goals in relation to the analysis of means, those who have been deciding on the goals should be prepared to accept the decision even when it runs contrary to their opinions.

In a political and decentralized milieu we expect parties to compete with eachother in the planning process. Their stands on specific issues can thus be expected to be partisan and agreement in one phase of the planning process does not exclude the possibility of trying to change the original decisions in a later stage. In the political process there will exist a strong informal organization alongside the formal one. If in such a situation a technical planning is instituted we do expect that planning to run into procedural difficulties. Participants in the planning are expected to put politics above technics and to make use of the technical process in whatever way they can, thus making it unlikely for the technical process to run in accordance with the principles that guide it.

The health planning system that we have already discussed covers three levels of government, central, regional and local.[29] The planning starts with the formulation of a national plan that is sent to the local authorities. Having gotten this plan the communes are supposed to make their five year plan in accordance with the national plan. The local plan is taken to the central government via the regional government in order to be confirmed. Only after this confirmation which must be given as the plan is presented or not at all, can the local authorities start implementing the plan. For activities not included in a confirmed plan the local authorities are not entitled to governmental assistance.

The experiences of this planning have been very discouraging, indeed. In a case study on a local health center. it was found that the plan for 1974-78 was confirmed in mid 1974. The next plan was confirmed nine month after the first year of the plan had started. The plan for the years 1976-80 was not confirmed until mid 1977, e. e. 1 1/2 year after the beginning of the plan period. The next confirmation was delayed almost a year. These short illustrations are in no way unique. They are in fact built into the planning system which is a school example of a technically rational system within the field of administration, that is a system containing practically no redundance, thus being vulnerable to any unexpected events.[30]

[29] I have presented the bureaucratized and inflexible decision-process around larger investments within the health planning system in, *Krister Stahlberg*, Byrakrati och Demokrati, Nordisk Administrativ Tidskrift, nr. 3, 1977, pp. 172-80.

[30] On redundancy see *Martin Landau*, Redundancy, Rationality and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, *Public Administration Review*, nr 4, 1969, pp. 346-58.

Not only have different parties to the planning been too stringently tied to eachother, the experience also indicates that those who manage the overall process have not lived up to their own expectations. During the planning process itself there have been made changes in the directives for the planning thus making it even in principle impossible for the process to work.

The difficulties in even institutionalizing the formal process are of course practical problems that probably can be overcome as the planning system matures. The examples cited show, however, that the difficulties cannot be overcome in a short time and that they are indicate a "rationalistic" shortsightedness. As we move to considering the relationship between different steps in the process we are perhaps faced with problems that are impossible to solve unless the conditions of planning are altered, that is unless the causal prerequisites of technical planning are met.

In the already mentioned study on communal planning a number of observations were made that have a bearing on the relationship between steps in the planning process. I have already said that the character of the means ends hierarchy that was found in some of the plans was not indicated. Neither could I find any indication of analysis of means in relation to the general goals. In fact the goals were presented as a totally self-contained part of the plans. Disregarding the missing link between goals and means we would still expact that alternative means were delibered upon in a systematical fashion. Such deliberations may or may not have occured. However, even if they did occur, they left no discernible marks on the plan. In fact we can go futher and assert that the information produced within the planning process could not be used for such deliberations. And, to go still one step further, how could the information be used for such noble purposes as we lack such theories that would make a comparison between alternative means feasible.[31]

What in fact seemed to be the normal procedure in setting priorities was to bargain between the parties on what specific project was to be carried through first. In a typically political manner many concrete projects were debated at the same time thus making it possible for many parties to have some success in the final decision-making. T Thus we find that formally rational procedures are not very useful in a political milieu, a conclusion that is banal to make, but which must stand repeating as long as it is disregarded by programmers.

The third aspect in our assessment of premature programming was to be concerned with results. From our examination thus far we may already infer that it is unlikely that technical planning results[31] implementable plans in a political surrounding, that is if technical planning would be possible in such a milieu. I shall make a final empirical reference to the social and economic five year planning system at the national level in Finland.[32] This planning system produces a five year forecast that is attached as an appendix to the yearly budget proposal to Parliament. This forecast represents a summary of the plans produced in the sector ministries and the position taken to these plans by the Ministry of Finance. In a study made of this planning system over the years 1973-81 (the last plan covered the years 1977-81) it was found that after deflating the numbers and correcting them for whatever administrative changes that liad occurred, the differences between the budget and the plan was considerable. The budget and the

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[31] See *Wildavsky*, Policy analysis is ..., op. cit. for a short summary of these arguments.
[32] See note 24.

plan are the same for the first year, that is they are prepared simultaneously. But for later years there exists large differences between earlier preferences and actual decisions. We would perhaps expect that within a rational system there would exist an inter-relationship between the budget and the plan for the next year, but such interrelationship is hard to detect. The decisions made by the Ministry of Finance on the plan and by the Parliament on the budget does not change the attitude of the ministries to any appreciable extent. The next plan is made as optimistically as the one before, just as we might expect if we adhered to a political and not to a technical view on planning.

The results also point to a factor which we have touched upon too slightly in this paper. The magnitude of the variation from one plan to another, from a plan to subsequent budgets and from budgets to subsequent plans seems to be correlated to the type of issues being involved. We could say that the more programmable the decisions are, that is the more recurrent they are in nature and the more they are regulated by laws and ordinances, the more closely expenditures in plans and budgets concur.[33] This can be seen for instance regarding salaries to be paid to governmental employees. But as we move to new projects and to investment expenditures the differences between plans and budgets are enormous. That is, the more political the situation, the less likely we are to succeed in formalized decision-making. And here we have touched upon the paradox of technical planning: The more we need planning according to the technical vision, the less likely this planning is to succeed. The inability to appreciate this paradox lies at the root of the tragedy in attempting to apply technical planning to political conditions.

8.   Summary

Planning is a decision-making process in which many decisions are made simultaneously with an orientation toward future consequences of those decisions. Planning as such is growing more frequent. The question is not whether planning but what type of planning. There exists many types of planning.

Certain types of planning are well suited to the conditions of the planning system. Other types of planning are not equally well suited to these conditions. When the attempted type of planning runs contrary to the conditions favoring planning, we can talk about premature programming of planning.

The premature programming of planning can be seen to arise because it is not always percieved by political and administrative actors to be in their interest to institutionalize planning that fits the circumstances. When causal and intentional factors thus run counter to eachother we get premature programming.

A common type of such programming occurs when powerful actors percieve it to be in their interest to initiate a technical planning system with an emphasis on formal plans and allocations of resources to existing programs, but when the conditions of planning favor political planning, that is when the conditions are not a centralized as would be needed for a successful technical planning. An increasing number of empirical studies point out the wastefulness of these attempts at giving the King nonexistent new clothes.

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[33] See *Simon*, op. cit.