ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE MEXICAN POLITICAL REFORM

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As the Mexican bourgeoisie has grown progressively more powerful and more closely associated with international capital, the Mexican state has found itself subject to increasing pressures from the business sphere, and is losing popular support as a result.

The traditional political parties, including the state party (the PRI), have been incapable of channelling the existing social discontent through the state’s official institutions and the elections.

With the 1976 crisis, a new political reform—fundamentally electoral—was put into effect. There are eight registered opposition parties, none of which is truly competitive with the PRI.

The number of votes for the PRI are decreasing, while electoral abstention is on the rise.

The new economic crisis has increased the state’s unpopularity, and the majority of the opposition parties are in crisis. For the state, the political reform has not been a success, but neither has it been for the parties of the opposition. Although the Mexican state is capitalist, it was, at least until the end of the 1930’s, the society’s factotum. The post-revolutionary political bureaucracy which took over the state granted and took away justice as well as privilege so that the social classes, disarticulated by the civil war, were reconstituted in less than 20 years. This state was deliberately conflated with government, and even more, with executive power. Its appearance reflected (as it continues attempting to reflect) a state beyond classes, above any private interests of the civil society. And in its rhetoric (as opposed to its concrete actions with which its rhetoric rarely corresponds) it appeared to be supported by the workers, that is, by the majority. This doesn’t mean, of course, that the state has declared itself an enemy of capital, although frequently it did in relation to one or another of its factions.

Everything grew in the state’s shadow: business, unions, political parties, and even the church, which had lost almost everything with the

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Reform Laws in the 19th century. But in contrast to the mass organizations and political parties which have only recently begun to acquire their own consistent dynamic, the groups associated with capital and with the church began little by little to stand on their own feet in postures frequently contrary to the state, especially after the Second World War.

It would not be unreasonable to explain this phenomenon as the result of a state policy (itself a product of the Revolution) which consistently fluctuated between the use of consensus and control and which emphasized the latter. This was the case in the state's relations with the country's majorities. Its minorities, however, quickly established a different set of rules in their relations with the state.

The bourgeoisie has understood for many years now that the Mexican State's appearance is exactly that—an appearance. That is, it knows that its demands of the state have almost always been met, even at the cost of the workers who are the state's principal pillar of legitimacy by consensus. In fact, once the capitalist class began to see itself as the increasingly powerful motor of Mexico's so-called development, irreplaceable according to the existing forces in the country and largely thanks to the privileges granted to it by the state, it grew to such an extent that now, as a social class, it demands of and benefits from the majority of the state's public policies, especially those which have to do with its reproduction as class.

The last world war effected major modifications on the international model of capitalist accumulation. The war economy's technological innovations transformed the productive systems of the most advanced industrial countries. The relations between these countries and the most developed dependent countries such as Argentina, Brasil and Mexico were, in terms of the old imperialist model of the extensive exploitation of primary materials and the selling of manufactured products, transformed as well. These modifications, along with others less relevant, substantially altered Mexico's post-revolutionary dynamic. At the end of the world conflict, the major part of Mexico's substitutive production returned to the countries from which it had come, which meant the beginning of the great external debts, the opening of our borders to direct and indirect investment, the end of the populism of the earlier period, worker repression, the end of land distribution, state support of industry, and the deterioration of nationalism, though the official rhetoric would lead one to believe otherwise.

In response to the modifications in the model of accumulation on a world scale, the industrialization process promoted in Mexico was seen as a panacea for the country’s underdevelopment, without an understanding that such a measure would only accentuate its dependence upon an economic subordination to international capitalism, represented by
that time by the United States.

The historical conjuncture favored the emergence of a domestic bourgeoisie disposed to association with international capital and of a middle bourgeoisie with nationalist tendencies and which demanded an indulgent treatment by the state. The state began to weaken in the economic realm; from having been the director of the nation's economy, it gradually became the country's most important support of the private accumulation of capital, national and foreign. Only in the political sphere did the Mexican state maintain control, although this control was different than that which it had exercised between the wars: repression, including anti-communist, became the common denominator. The government, along with the state party (Institutional Revolutionary) and with the worker and campesino organizations controlled by it, used force to suffocate all attempts to achieve class autonomy, and, at the same time, modified the electoral law for the first time since 1918, granting registration to parties considered extremists, either to the right or to the left. This measure had two very clear purposes: first, to create the image of a pluralistic political system in order to recapture part of the consensus lost as a result of its economic policies; and second, to represent the electoral option to those recalcitrant mass sectors which tended to escape from the PRI's corporatized control.

The Mexican Communist Party (PCM) was registered at that time. But as a counterpart, the state sponsored the formation of another, more reformist party. This was the Popular Party—since 1960, the Popular Socialist Party (PPS). Once this latter party was constituted, the electoral law was again reformed and the PCM along with the extreme right represented by the Popular Force Party, lost its registration in 1949.

If the state's power deteriorated on the economic level in the face of the bourgeoisie's newly acquired vigor, it didn't fare too well in the political sphere either. It suffered serious ruptures in the hear of what ex-president Calles called "the revolutionary family", that is, within the political bureaucracy. The most important of these schisms translated into the creation of a new party, the Federation of Mexican People's Party, which in 1952 presented the most important opposition to the state party since its foundation. This event, as unexpected as it was unwelcome, motivated a new electoral reform law which the legalization of any new party almost impossible. From this moment until 1976, the party system in Mexico would remain the same: with three very weak opposition parties—the National Action Party (PAN), the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), and the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM)—and the PRI, with all the government's resources and with an almost absolute control over the country's mass organizations.

As a reflection of the expansion of world capitalism, the Mexican eco-
nomy sustained a sufficiently high growth rate to be able to guarantee a relatively decent standard of living to the principle business enterprise’s workers and to the middle classes, especially urban. But this economic growth never signified a distribution of wealth, and soon the less favored sectors found their situation deteriorating seriously, especially in the rural areas. The illegal opposition proliferated in the countryside and guerrilla-type armed struggles were not uncommon in different areas of the country. Furthermore, urban groups outside of government control—especially radicalized intellectuals—affected the universities from which emerged student movements questioning the forms of political hegemony and the increasingly visible inequalities in Mexican society. The institutionalized parties—the PRI and the legal opposition—didn’t represent any option in the face of the generalized incontinence and the real and conscious opposition in the country. Other political organizations including the PCM represented little alternative to the institutional power. In fact, the left as a whole was acutely atomized. The Mexican state’s political apparatus was entirely incapable of responding to popular demands. The popular student movement of 1968 had the historical opportunity to prove it. It is no accident that that year marked the beginning of a new political process in the country.

If the conditions of the world economy required the implementation of austerity policies, this course was impossible in Mexico without exacerbating the nonconformist spirit that had been brutally smashed in October, 1968. The best option for maintaining stability, which interested the state as well as the ruling class, was to resort to the use of political palliatives such as the broadening of suffrage and the state’s provision of social services which would compensate for the salary deterioration that capital was not interested in avoiding. On the one hand, the state opted for an alarmingly increased external debt, and on the other, for a political flexibility only comparable to that which existed during the Cardenist period when populism was a common formula in most developed Latin American countries. The workers movement, organized under the control of the state, suffered new, promisory divisions of a democratic nature. In the poorest rural zones, campesinos invaded lands and received a fairly indifferent response from the local and national governments, except in those areas where the agro-exporting bourgeoisie had established itself. The left political groups, renewed because of the amnesty received by their previously imprisoned leaders, and because of the combative awakening occurring in important industrial unions—especially in electricity—immediately tried to form political parties. The Communists attempted to strengthen their party, to transform it into a mass organization with more radical propositions than they had sustained since the Popular Front era.
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The state's policy had serious repercussions. The country's dependence increased; large capital, especially international, benefited; the exchange value of the Mexican peso in relation to the dollar was maintained artificially; the country's commercial balance deteriorated even more than it already had; the governmental budget experienced the highest deficit in its history; and the effects of the world capitalist crisis in 1974-1975 were acutely felt within the Mexican borders.

In 1976, last year of a presidential succession, the Mexican economy confronted a series of very acute problems in spite of the state's efforts to the contrary. The crisis could no longer be overlooked; the state devalued the peso in order to favor the country's exports; the unions and autonomous campesino associations once again experienced repression; the most critical universities were again attacked; the more or less independent press was censured, including with force. Only the parties remained without mass support, without prestige, as symbols of a political obsolescence that the regime could not eliminate despite the electoral reform of 1973.

The Mexican state seemed to have lost its legitimacy before the civil society. The electoral results revealed an alarming increase in abstentionism, a stagnation in the number of votes for the legal opposition, and a decrease in votes for the PRI. Discussion of dictatorship, even fascism, was in the air as was that of a social-democratic type alternative to fascism, and especially, to socialism. The international decision centers—the Trilateral Commission, for instance—indiscriminately sponsored dictatorships and social-democratic governments in Latin America to guarantee the safeguarding of their interests in the face of increasingly combative masses and especially those masses engaged in the heroic struggle in Central America.

The Mexican government, with a long pragmatist tradition behind it, opted for controlled democracy when it proposed as its own an unenforceable proletarian demand: the political reform. The purpose of this measure was to widen political representation at restricted levels (above all, in the Chamber of Deputies) and to achieve an exclusively electoral political participation. It was therefore necessary to present new political options in the form of parties, and three of these received their registration with little difficulty: the Communist, the Mexican Democratic (PDM), from the traditional extreme right represented by the synarchists, and the Socialist Worker's (PST), with an eclectic, pro-governmental, reformist-socialist stance. At the same time, the state implemented a new economic and labor policy which it denominates "alliance for production". This meant, in short, austerity in public expenditures, investment in and creation of jobs, and, with respect to capital, increase in productivity and limitation of salary demands; that is, a policy clearly reflecting the International Monetary Fund's orientation.
The elections for federal deputies in July, 1979 constituted the political reform’s first test. In these, seven political parties participated, three, as we’ve already mentioned, with newly acquired registration. The results differed significantly from the pre-election prognoses. Nevertheless, immediately afterwards, a wide variety of opinions emerged about the elections’ outcome.

In his third governmental report, the country’s president José López Portillo, congratulated the new parties that had received definite registration as a result of the 1979 federal elections. He interpreted this registration as a broadening of the legitimacy of the country’s various ideological tendencies and said that they represented an “appeal to the nation’s conscience... (they have) proved to be... an alternative for many.” The president suggested that the central success of the political reform, “and not its failure as some would have it,” was the creation of an electoral portrait of our democracy,” portrait which reflected the extent of the abstentionism, the nullifications, and the deficiencies of the citizen registration. He seemed to respond to those who had characterized the electoral reform as a political snare when he said that “the decrees of this policy (the reform) are ethical, honorable, and in good faith, and not the result of any political inauthenticity, nor a veil to obscure problems, nor even less, a fool’s trap. And he added, “the political reform is irreversible. It is an open road with a fixed destiny, and the tracks laid there will be unerasable.” (our emphasis). Nevertheless, in the third ordinary period of the Chamber of Deputies (on October 5, 1981), López Portillo sent a reform initiative to the LFOPPE restricting parties’ democratic rights when he proposed that a party should lose its registration if it does not gain a 1.5% minimum of the total votes in any single election. This measure invalidated a previous one approved by the LFOPPE in 1977, which maintained that the registration would be taken away if in three successive elections a party did not obtain this same percentage of total votes. This reform of the LFOPPE, which wouldn’t be the last legislative interference in the issue, demonstrated the “irreversibility” of the political reform about which the country’s president had spoken two years earlier.

On another occasion, addressing a demonstration sponsored by the Socialist Worker’s Party (PST) in support of his candidacy, López Portillo stated that the political reform “is the legitimate route of a struggle in which you all have your rights,” “the political reform wasn’t conceived as a means of eliminating the struggle but rather as a means of legitimizing it.” (Uno Mas Uno, 12/15/79)* One year later, the Secretary of Gobernación, Olivares Santana would repeat the same formula: that the political

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* Beginning with this quotation, all are from the same source, unless otherwise indicated.
reform is neither concession nor maneuver, nor as means of pulling the wool over the people's eyes, but rather "a task and a commitment, so that, by way of democracy, Mexico can consolidate its independence, its sovereignty, and its institutional capacity."

Similarly, and also in the official rhetoric, the state emphasized the permanency of the political reform, which, it said, none has the right "to contradict or negate." (Olivares Santana, 1/17/80). Or, as the Secretary of Gobernación would affirm a year later (2/6/81), the political reform's principles haven't been abandoned... "we are just learning to live in a different reality." He pointed out that the political reform is irreversible "because we live in a society which is aware of and accepts its own contradictory nature."

On the other hand, several opposition parties have affirmed that "the political reform has been manipulated to silence the voice of dissidence." (2/3/81) A political prisoner in Monterrey, Nuevo León—Hirales Morán—ex-guerrilla, said, before the amnesty law had reached him, that the political reform "is an attempt by the bourgeoisie's most intelligent sector to modernize the country's political life and to break the stagnation that has characterized the system. This stagnation was manifested in social and political explosions such as those in 1968, as well as in the party's system's decadence, the growing abstentionism, and the decreasing capacity within the ruling class to avoid the conflicts that occur in its interior."

"I believe," added Hirales Morán, "that with this attempt, they are trying to improve the system in order to preserve it. The idea is... to change a part in order to maintain the essence—that is, the system's historically exercised political domination as well as the existence of the market economy, of private capital, of development." (1/19/80) On the theme of amnesty, Morán surely asked himself, as do Gallegos e Islas, still in prison, why amnesty was only applied to certain persons and not to all of those who had been arrested for strictly political reasons.

If the PRI's labor sector had been opposed to the political reform when it was first established, by 1980, after having considered the past electoral results, it began to speak out in favor of a broadening of the reform. The deputy Arturo Romo, then subcoordinator of the PRI's labor deputyship, stated that in order to extend it, its objectives would have to transcend those of a purely formal democracy; only in this way could it become a dialectical instrument that would permit it to transform the country's economic structure. Pedro Etienne of the PST, stated that the political reform is suffering attacks through jailings, obstacles, aggressions and assassinations in certain of the country's states (9/19/80); and Miguel A. Velasco, of the ex-MAUS party, characterized the reform as still an aspiration, since its political context has failed through state manipulation. (10/31/80).
After calling for the rejection of "the ideas and external influences which attempt to destroy our particularity and to humiliate our conscience," (10/30/80) Gustavo Carvajal, then president of the PRI, described the political reform as an opening to facilitate participation in the political contest, but added that this doesn't imply a "relinquishment of power." Emilio González, coordinator of the PRI labor section's deputyship, declared that the political parties' struggles would not be permitted to enter the unions because such a move would destroy the labor movement and union unity. (ibid). González's opinion once again confirmed the limited reach intended for the political reform. In response to these declarations, representatives of the PPM and the PRT coincided in their opinion that within the present regime there are no democratic exits. With respect to worker and campesino demands, Alvaro Lain of the PRT added: At this time the political reform conditions the workers' political liberties because they are subject to the control of official organizations such as the CTM and the CMOP, and in the countryside, the CEC and the CCI. (10/31/80)

It would seem to be the case, yet again, that the political reform was implemented with the exclusive end of institutionalizing the opposition via electoral participation. Beyond the electoral limits, little or nothing is permitted. And as if these restrictions on the government's political reform project were not sufficient, in recent dates they have tried to reduce its range even further. In the official words of Gustavo Carvajal, former PRI president and later Agrarian Reform Secretary, "the political reform doesn't mean permission to agitate the country." (4/13/80)

In the 1979 federal elections, the population eligible to vote totalled more than 27 million. Abstentionism reached more than 50% and surpassed that of 1976 (36.74%) and 1973 (39.49%). The states of Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit, Colima and Coahuila had the highest level of abstentionism (74%, 72%, 71%, 68%, and 67% respectively).

The PRI received approximately 9,700,000 votes or 69.84% of the total. The PAN continued to place second with 1,525,100 votes (40.7%). The Leftist Coalition (PCM, PPM, PSR, and MAUS) placed third with around 700,000 votes (5%) and the PPS won 2.8% or 390,000 votes. The PST came in fifth with 811,000 votes (2.26%). The PARM and the PDM dragged behind, with 2.16% and 2.13%, respectively.

The predictions made by the PRI government and party and by the opposition were not confirmed by the facts. Both hoped to diminish electoral abstentionism. But this did not occur. The PCM had projected winning ten districts by majority and obtaining thirty deputy seats via proportional representation. The PST spoke of winning fifty deputy seats and emerging as "the country's second political force." The PPS's top leader predicted that his party would receive one million votes and win
districts in eleven states. (All these declarations appeared in various Mexico city newspapers on 5/10/79). The PAN won thirty-nine deputy seats via proportional representation. The PCM obtained eighteen, the PARM twelve, and the PPS eleven, in spite of the fact that its total votes outdid the PARM by nearly 90,000. The PST and the PDM gained ten deputy seats each. In Mexico City, the PRI had less support and the opposition, proportionally more than in the rest of the country. Only in five of the three hundred uninominal districts did more than 80% of the eligible populatio vote: two in the state of Mexico, and three in Morelos, Baja California, and Guanajuato.

Some observers have maintained, with a great deal of truth that the political reform was conceived more for the urban areas and for federal elections, particularly for federal deputyships, than for the states, small cities, and rural regions. This assessment is based on the real existence of caciques (local semi-feudal bosses), local pressure groups of a backward nature, some governors and several mayors who have confused the act of governing with private property and other elements of the apportionment of power, which, paradoxically has benefited the federal government because of the stability it provides in practically all areas of the country free of direct, centralized control which would be difficult to exercise. In most states, the abstentionism was considerable. It’s clear that the political reform did not manage to penetrate the states, and could not, as a result, undermine the abstentionism. In states like Tamaulipas, Aguascalientes and Oaxaca, the abstentionism reached nearly 70% (12/9/80). In some small town, like Lázaro Cárdenas in Michoacán, the December, 1980 elections to reelect municipal seats reflected an 80% abstentionism. In several cities there were acts of rebellion in response to the PRI impositions; these would be too great to number. Moreover, the press reported a great number of protests against fraud and electoral repression. On the other hand, in the local elections only the PRI saw an increase in the percentage of votes in its favor; for all the opposition parties percentage diminished from 1979 to 1980. One can interpret this increase in the PRI’s favor as being due to the governing party’s capacity to develop mechanisms to insure votes in the municipal and state polls by way of open support of public authorities and businessmen.

Participation in the Chamber of Deputies, where the greatest expectation of political representation via José López Portillo’s political reform lay, stimulate high hopes, particularly within the Left. The government took precautions, however, in order to avoid the Left’s possible interference in the PRI dominion. Before the 1979 federal elections, it took steps to make a full democratic functioning of the Chamber of Deputies impossible. The approved Organic Union Congress Law assured the survival of the “Gran Comisión” as an instrument of political control. Only one
PCM and one PDM deputy opposed this project, which guaranteed parliamentary control to the PRI.

The PRI had 296 deputies in the fifty-first legislature. The opposition had 104 seats. None of the six opposition parties’ initiatives were approved, and even their proposals were frozen at the committee level. The same thing occurred to the PRI’s labor sector deputies’ initiatives. In the first session of the legislature, the seven parties presented twenty-eight initiatives—and only three were discussed in the plenary session; two PRI initiatives and a PCM initiative; the latter discussed and rejected. The other twenty-five were returned to committee. Meanwhile, thirty-nine proposals sent by the executive branch were all approved. At the close of the second period of the sessions, the Communist delegation complained that 188 opposition initiatives had not been ruled on, and proposed extraordinary sessions be held. (12/29/80) The complained that forty-two initiatives had been frozen and criticized the speed with which the chamber had discussed and passed judgement.

The opposition brought interesting constitutional reforms and laws to session. There were times when a competition was apparent between the Left parties and the PRI labor sector deputies over who could present more and better initiatives in favor of the workers and the economic independence of the country. But there were also what is known as “goals” against the leftist defenses, in which deputies of the coalition unwillingly approved reforms on the procedural aspects of the Federal Labor Law that in fact restricted the right to strike. Despite this, none of the initiatives had any value, not even as pretexts to mobilize broad sectors of the population. With good reason, Valentín Campa, then head of the PCM, after indicating that the political struggle within the chamber of deputies is limited “because the voting machinery is principally PRI-ist,” suggested that the only way to seriously advance is via mass mobilization. (10/25/80). This evidently, did not occur, fact which provoked serious criticisms leading to accusations of electoralism, parliamentarism directed toward that part of the Left which in fact is parliamentary: the PPS, the PST and the then Left Coalition.

Now, after two parties received their registration (conditioned upon the election results), and the Communist Party has transformed itself in the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (result of the fusion of the old Leftist Coalition and MAP), there are nine parties which, with seven presidential candidates will compete in the July 4, 1982 elections. (This talk was written in April, 1982).

Contrary to what one might think, the majority of the political parties have experienced some kind of internal crisis, in some cases, serious. The PRI, for example, attempted to modernize itself and become, as its president put it, “an authentic political party.” But it didn’t achieve either
of its two objectives—not even changes in its organization. The presidential succession posed a serious problem for this party and for the government itself about the selection of its candidates. The man who at that moment was the PRI’s leader aspired to the Republic’s presidency in absolute antagonism with the man finally chosen.

Two more parties, rightist like the PRI, have suffered acute crises, principally for economic and leadership reasons. I am referring to the Authentic Mexican Revolutionary Party (PARM) and the Mexican Democratic Party (PDM). Nevertheless, the remaining rightist party—the National Action Party (PAN)—which deteriorated a great deal in the last elections, has probably recuperated sufficiently to place second in; the last elections, has probably recuperated sufficiently to place second in July.

In the center-left, that political grey-area which is difficult to locate on a left/right scale, there are three political parties two of which collaborate directly or indirectly with the national government. Here, I’m referring to the Socialist Worker’s Party (SPT) and the Popular Socialist Party (PPS). This last party, like the PARM, has decided to support the PRI’s presidential candidate. But the PST is the only one of these two parties that has suffered internal ruptures, which stem from the party’s lack of democracy and the collaboration that it has been involved in with the government.

The political reform, the elections, and parliamentary activity pose the most serious problems for the two registered Left parties: the PSUM, already mentioned, and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT), Mexican Section of the IV International.

For both of these parties the risk exists of falling into a electoralist and parliamentarist politics which, given Mexico’s conditions—very different from those of the Western Europe countries—are judged as reformist. In its brief electoral and parliamentary experience, the PSUM, as the former Leftist Coalition, overlooked the necessary mass mobilizations to support its propositions in the chamber and dedicated the majority of its resources to its parliamentary activity and not to gain influence in the labor and campesino sectors. The second, the PRT, and given that its registration as a party is very recent, has dedicated itself to gaining influence among workers and campesinos. As a result, it would be difficult to project that it revolutionary positions will become reformist.

The great expectation for the immediate future, from the Mexican workers’ point of view, is located with the perspectives of these two Left parties, but not precisely because of their electoral or parliamentary possibilities. The great debate, we believe, doesn’t concern the state-sponsored electoral reform which, as we’ve seen, tends to be devalued. This debate, rather, has to do with the non-collaborating left whose goals are obviously
not to gain superior electoral positions in 1982, nor their organizations' quantitative growth, but instead, the achievement through permanent action (in contrast to the exclusive logic of the bourgeois democracy and independent of those limits that the State attempts to impose), of an autonomy of class in the worker's movement, in the mass movements in general, and in its political direction.

KEY TO THE ACRONYMS

CFE: Federal Electoral Commission, composed of the PRI majority.

CI: Left Coalition: grouping constituted by the PCM, the PPM, the PSR, and the MAUS for the 1979 elections, which was replaced in 1981 by the fusion of these organizations, with the MAP, into a new coalition.

CNC and CCI: National Campesino Confederation and the Independent Campesino Central, which conform the campesino sector of the PRI.

CNOP: National Confederation of Popular Organizations: it constitutes the popular sector of the PRI and although it's multi-class in its composition, it's dominated by professional associations.

CTM: Worker's Confederation of Mexico. Worker organization whose majority belong to the PRI and the Work Congress (Congreso del Trabajo).

LFOPPE: Federal Law on Political Organizations and Electoral Processes; this name was substituted for the Federal Electoral Law with the political reform of 1977.

MAP: Popular Action Movement; recently founded, small organization now fused within the PSUM, defender of revolutionary nationalism and composed principally of university professors and students.

MAUS: Action and Socialist Unity Movement. The smallest of the organizations that forms part of the PSUM, it is composed almost entirely of old Communist Party militants that were expelled in the 1940's.

PAN: National Action Party; rightist organization in favor of big business, and ideologically inspired by moderate Catholic thought.

PARM: Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution, hardly different from the PRI but slightly to the Right. It is considered to be an artificial party.

PCM: Mexican Communist Party, now non-existent since the fusion with the other organizations (see CI) into the PSUM.
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PDM: Mexican Democratic Party, of sinarquist and Catholic origin. In its early years it was a fascist organization below the name of the National. Its early years it was a fascist organization under the name of the National Sinarchist Union. It competes with the PAN in spite of their identical origin.

PPM: the Mexican People's Party, it is the result of a schism in the PPS in 1975; now non-existent since it forms a part of the PSUM.

PPS: Popular Socialist Party. It calls itself Marxist-Leninist, but in reality it has collaborated with the government since its foundation.

PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party. State party, with a cuasi-political monopoly, composed since 1941 by three relatively autonomous sectors: worker, campesino, and popular.

PRT: Revolutionary Worker's Party, Mexican section of the IV International, Trotskyist.

PSD: Social Democratic Party, of a business origin, progressive and nationalist. Its positions are less Social Democratic than the PRI's.

PSR: Revolutionary Socialist Party, now part of the PSUM. A very small organization.

PST: Socialist Worker's Party, considered, along with the PPS and the PARM, a party in collaboration with the government.